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THE PARADOX OF INSURANCE
Gideon Parchomovsky* and Peter Siegelman **

In this Article, we uncover a paradoxical phenomenon that has hitherto largely escaped the
attention of legal scholars and economists, yet it has far‐reaching implications for insurance
law: loss‐creation by uninsured parties caused by the presence of insurance. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom, we show that insurance can create significant negative externalities by
inducing third parties to engage in antisocial, illegal and unethical activities in order to
extract money from insureds or insurers. Moreover, as the amount and scope of insurance
grows, so does its distortionary effect on third parties. We term this phenomenon the paradox
of insurance. The risk and harm‐causing effects of insurance are ubiquitous. They can be seen
in a myriad of contexts, from medical insurances to automobile liability insurance to
kidnapping insurance to directors’ and officers’ liability insurance, and even life insurance. It
may even have played a role in the 2008 financial crisis. We also explain the economic, social
and psychological reasons for this phenomenon. Our analysis suggests that the downside of
insurance is far greater than previously believed; in extreme cases, it may even offset the social
benefits of insurance.
Against this backdrop, we advance normative recommendations for handing the problem. We
start by explaining why the standard techniques that insurers use to curb opportunistic
behavior by insureds (deductibles, co‐pays, and loss‐control or mandatory precautions) are ill‐
suited to address third party moral hazard; hence, it presents a formidable challenge. We then
move on to construct a comprehensive legal response, comprising a combination of self‐help,
regulatory and technological measures, as well as qui tam suits that allow members of the
public to sue opportunistic actors who seek to misappropriate insurance proceeds. Together,
these interventions should reduce the incidence of third party moral hazard.
*
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INTRODUCTION
In this Article, we explore a widespread problem that has so far largely evaded the attention
of legal scholars and economists alike and has the potential to change the way we view
insurance: how insurance alters the behavior of third parties. We show that the presence of
insurance can induce third parties—anyone other than the insurer or the insured—to create
or cause losses, or to increase risks covered by insurance, even at a cost to themselves, in order
to capture or otherwise divert an insurance payment or to save on costs. We further
demonstrate that the higher the insurance coverage, the stronger the distortionary effect of
insurance on the behavior of third parties. We term this phenomenon “the insurance
paradox.” The insurance paradox spans many contexts and legal systems.
Begin with the “slip and sue” phenomenon that plagues retail stores all over the U.S.1 Driven
by the motivation to collect insurance money, patrons feign falls in stores and rush to sue the
owners. Between 2008 and 2011, slip‐and‐sue cases went up by 25% nationwide,2 costing retail
stores millions of dollars in higher insurance premia. According to reports, organized crime
organizations were quick to join the action, targeting specific chains with this illicit behavior.3
While security cameras helped cull some of the easier cases, the problem persists.
1

2

3

See Publix Super Markets, Inc. v. Anderson, 92 So. 3d 922, 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (“Experience
has shown all retail stores that people who fall in their stores try to be compensated for their injuries.
Experience has also shown those stores that bogus or frivolous or exaggerated claims might be
made.”). Incidents of slip‐and‐fall fraud have also been widely reported. See, e.g., Press Release, The
United States Attorneyʹs Office for the Southern District of New York, 3 Members of Trip‐And‐Fall
Scheme Convicted of Defrauding New York City‐Area Businesses and Their Insurance Companies
of More Than $31.7 Million (May. 28, 2019).
Bryan Polcyn, Slip and fall scam takes insurance companies for millions, FOX6 News (Nov. 15, 2011, 4:41
PM), https://fox6now.com/2011/11/01/slip‐and‐fall‐scam‐takes‐insurance‐companies‐for‐millions/.
See Id. (“The scammers usually work in teams, but few are prolific as a band women accused of
fleecing dozens of Milwaukee area retailers.”); see also Matthew Goldstein & Jessica Silver‐
Greenberg, How a Web of Slip‐and‐Fall Cases Puts a New Spin on an Old‐Fashioned Scheme, The New
York Times (May 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/11/business/dealbook/how‐a‐web‐
of‐slip‐and‐fall‐cases‐puts‐a‐new‐spin‐on‐an‐old‐fashioned‐scheme.html (“A group of five men
orchestrated the fraud, recruiting people to stage so‐called slip‐and‐fall accidents, and then
organizing the legal and medical appointments that followed . . . . Along the way, the group enlisted
doctors, lawyers and finance companies.”).

Our next example comes from a video from the United Kingdom that went viral on the
internet.4 It features a motorcyclist wheeling his motorcycle backwards into a moving car,
slamming the motorcycle into the car, jumping on the hood and smashing his head repeatedly
against the windshield; he ends up on the ground, writhing in “pain.” All the while, a friend
of his films the aftermath of the incident. The motorcyclist continues to feign pain, when the
driver of the car gets out in shock to check on him. But when she tells them that she has
recorded the whole incident on a dashboard camera, the “injured” motorcyclist miraculously
recovers, and both he and his witness flee the scene. What explains this strange incident? The
most likely explanation is that the motorcyclist and his accomplice sought to claim the
generous third party auto insurance that is mandatory in the United Kingdom.5
An even more appalling example comes from Sicily, where organized criminals have a
practice of deliberately inflicting significant and gruesome injuries to homeless people and
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ViralHog,
Insurance
Scam
Backfires
on
Scammer,
YOUTUBE
(July
14,
2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UnP7‐1‐W4VQ. The video has had more than 4 million views,
and judging by the setting and accents, it appears to take place somewhere in Britain.
Road Traffic Act, 1988, c. 52 §143(1)(a) (Eng.) (as amended) states that “ a person must not use a
motor vehicle on a road or other public place unless there is in force in relation to the use of the
vehicle by that person such a policy of insurance or such a security in respect of third party risks as
complies with the requirements of this Part of this Act . . .” Section 143(2) makes it an offense to
drive without appropriate insurance. Crucially, the Road Traffic Act defines what constitutes an
acceptable insurance policy, which “. . . must insure [the policyholder] in respect of any liability
which may be incurred by him . . . in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage
to property caused by, or arising out of, the use of the vehicle . . .” (emphasis added). Policies are
not required to cover “more than £1,200,000 in respect of all such liabilities as may be incurred in
respect of damage to property caused by, or arising out of, any one accident involving the vehicle,”
however. In the U.S. personal injury plaintiffs typically limit their claims to the amount of the
defendant’s insurance coverage. Thus, they rarely reach the defendant’s own assets, which are
known among lawyers as “blood money.” Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral
Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 L. & SOC. REV. 275 (2001) (hereinafter – Blood Money) While we can’t
be sure that the same norms apply to plaintiffs in the UK, we suspect that they do, which implies
that high‐limit insurance coverage makes fraud dramatically more profitable. And of course, many
drivers do not have sufficient wealth to pay for the injuries they cause, so in these cases, any
recovery by the “victim” can only come from the insurer, if there is one. See, e.g., Eric Smith &
Randall Wright, Why Is Automobile Insurance in Philadelphia So Damn Expensive? 82 AMER. ECON. REV.
756 (1992) (suggesting that there are large numbers of judgment‐proof drivers in the U.S. who prefer
to have minimal or no insurance coverage).

drug addicts, in whose name they had previously taken out insurance policies.6 Here, too, the
availability of insurance changes the behavior of third parties.
But perhaps the case that best illustrates the paradox of insurance is kidnap insurance.7 Some
versions of this insurance cover all or part of the expenses incurred by the family of the victim.
It is intended to provide policyholders with both peace of mind and financial risk‐spreading,
assuring them that if their loved ones fall victim to this crime, the insurer will cover part of
the cost of securing their release. Perversely, however, the presence of insurance actually
increases the probability of kidnapping. There is some evidence that kidnappers respond
positively to the presence of insurance: when kidnap insurance is banned, kidnappings tend
to decrease.8 Similarly, the incidence of piracy—the maritime version of kidnapping—also
seems to positively correlate with the ransom amounts paid.9 Tellingly, Italy, Colombia and
other countries where kidnapping has been endemic have actually banned kidnap insurance
(although there is evidence that it nevertheless continues to operate in secret).10
The effect of insurance on the behavior of third parties can also be seen in the operation of
Directors and Officers (D&O) insurance in the U.S., where insurance may induce third parties
to manufacture suits against corporate officers in the hope of collecting from their insurer.11
Similar effects can be seen in the U.S. healthcare market, where a wide range of wasteful, as
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Frances D’Emilio, Police Say Sicily Gangsters Crushed Limbs in Insurance Fraud, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Aug. 8, 2018 available at https://www.apnews.com/a38d73b5875e460dab91e770cb0017a9. (Eleven
people were arrested, and the amounts of money in question allegedly reached several hundred
thousand Euros in this case).
The story is actually more complicated than this simple example suggests. As we discuss at greater
length below, kidnap insurance has apparently evolved various techniques to mitigate third party
moral hazard problems. See Anja Shortland, Governing kidnap for ransom: Lloyd’s as a “private regime”,
30 GOVERNANCE 283 (2017).
We appreciate that the evidence in favor of a causal relationship between insurance and kidnapping
is not robust by the standards of modern social science.
Shortland at Id; see also Olaf J. de Groot, Matthew D. Rablen & Anja Shortland, Barrgh‐gaining with
Somali
Pirates
(European
Security
Economics
Working
Paper
74,
2012),
https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.408689.de/diw_econsec0074.pdf.
See, e.g., Meadow Clendenin, “No Concessions” With no Teeth: How Kidnap and Ransom Insurers and
Insureds are Undermining U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, 56 EMORY L. J. 741 (2006) (suggesting that
kidnapping insurance was at odds with US security policy because it made kidnaps more likely and
funded operations of terrorist groups).
Again, the story is more complicated than it appears, and D&O insurers may have developed some
clever strategies to fend‐off strike suits of this kind. See discussion infra, Part I.B.2.

well as downright fraudulent, decisions are made possible by the availability of insurance.12
For example, there is compelling evidence that insurance facilitates the over‐use of medical
imaging services. Patients are commonly treated based on the coverage they have, rather than
their medical condition, a practice for which doctors have even coined the descriptive phrase
“a wallet biopsy.” 13 Such industry practices that received the title “offensive medicine” 14
contribute to the notoriously high cost of healthcare in the U.S.
The presence of insurance has also contributed to serious wrongdoing in the provision of
rehabilitation services for opioid addicts.15 Some states now host a sizeable industry of for‐
profit rehab centers that offer recruiting bonuses to freelance “patient brokers” to attract
addicts whose treatment can be billed to their insurer. 16 Such rehabilitation services are

In his seminal article on moral hazard, Kenneth Arrow noted that “[t]o some extent the professional
relationship between physician and patient limits the normal [moral] hazard in various forms of
medical insurance. By certifying to the necessity of given treatment or the lack thereof, the physician
acts as a controlling agent on behalf of the insurance companies. Needless to say, it is a far from
perfect check.” Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AMER.
ECON. REV. 941, 961 (1963). Arrow did not seem to see the possibility of the opposite effect,
however—that doctors could promote, rather than deter, unnecessary claims.
13 See, e.g., M. Kit Delgado et al, Factors Associated With the Disposition of Severely Injured Patients Initially
Seen at Non–Trauma Center Emergency Departments Disparities by Insurance Status, 149 JAMA SURGERY
422, 427 (2014) (concluding that “severely injured patients initially seen at non‐trauma center
E[mergency] D[epartment]s who are uninsured are more likely to be appropriately transferred [to
a trauma center], whereas patients who are insured are more likely to be hospitalized in the non‐
trauma center” because the latter group are more profitable for the treating hospital.) But see,
Charles D. Mabry, MD Does a “Wallet Biopsy” Lead to Inappropriate Trauma Patient Care? 149 JAMA
SURGERY 430, 430 (2014) (commenting critically on some findings of the study, while acknowledging
that “a common notion in the trauma community that the financial status (known commonly as a
“wallet biopsy”) of a patient influences how and where trauma patients are treated).
14 Ronen Avraham & Max M. Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform on Intensity of Treatment: Evidence
from the Heart Patients, 39 J. HEALTH ECON. 273 (2015) (finding that capping damages increased the
probability that doctors choose a riskier, but more profitable heart by‐pass surgery rather than an
angioplasty, an example of “offensive medicine.”).
15 See Julia Laurie, “Mom, When They Look at Me They See Dollar Signs:” How rehab recruiters are luring
recovering
opiod
addicts
into
a
deadly
cycle,
MOTHER
JONES,
March
2019,
https://www.motherjones.com/crime‐justice/2019/02/opioid‐epidemic‐rehab‐recruiters/. For a
harrowing first‐person account of this system that assigns an important causal role to insurance, see
Colton Wooten, My Years in the Florida Shuffle of Drug Addiction: Cycling through relapse and recovery,
and the industry that enables both, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 14, 2019.
16 Laurie, Id.
12

considered “essential benefits” under the Affordable Care Act,17 and must be offered without
annual or lifetime caps, creating a large pool of money that unscrupulous centers can tap
into. Their business model is to bring in patients for “treatment” that is completely ineffective,
precisely so as to generate a relapse and readmission shortly thereafter. This practice is known
in the addiction community as “the Florida shuffle,” “a cycle wherein recovering users are
wooed aggressively by [for profit rehabilitation centers] and freelance “patient brokers” in an
effort to fill beds and collect insurance money.”18 Rehab centers can charge private insurers as
much as $50,000‐$100,000 per month of treatment; 19 and private insurance claims for
treatment of opioid users rose from $75 million in 2011 to $650 million in 2014. 20 The
availability of generous insurance payments has helped create an entire industry of phony
rehabilitation programs whose purpose is precisely not to cure addiction, but rather to
maintain it as a source of ongoing revenue.
There is even evidence that third party moral hazard played a significant role in the financial
crisis of 2008. Many readers are familiar with the story that large banks took advantage of the
state‐sponsored de facto insurance, established by their size and vitality for the economy, to
give risky loans that promised a high return. The standard explanation for the crisis is that
banks knew that they were “too big to fail,” and therefore took on excessive risks, certain that
the government would have to bail them out if things went sour. 21 While plausible, this
narrative has encountered criticism for failing to account for some important facts about
banks’ lending behavior.22 A complementary story suggests that third party moral hazard
played a significant role in the crisis. Its effects were felt as private creditors of the “too big to
fail” banks realized that there was no need to monitor them, given the certainty of a bailout.23

17

18

19
20

21
22

23

See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(E) (2010) (defining Essential Health Benefits to include “Mental health
and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment”).
Laurie, supra note 12. See also, https://www.fixthefloridashuffle.com/florida‐shuffle. Even worse,
Laurie’s reporting uncovered examples in which brokers actually induced recovering addicts to
relapse so that they could be referred to a “treatment” center.
Id.
Id. (citing data from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration). Of course, not all of
this increase represents fraud.
See, e.g., JAMES KWAK & SIMON JOHNSON, 13 BANKERS (2009).
See NICOLA GENAOLI & ANDREI SHLEIFER, A CRISIS OF BELIEFS: INVESTOR PSYCHOLOGY AND FINANCIAL
FRAGILITY (Princeton University Press, 2018). The authors argue that bankers did not make
deliberate efforts to take on unjustified risks because they were covered by “too big to fail”
insurance. Instead, the bad loans that created the financial crisis were based on bankers’
overoptimism about the riskiness of their loan portfolios.
Darrell Duffie, Prone to Fail: The Pre‐Crisis Financial System, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 81, 99 (2018) (noting
perverse effect of implicit guarantees on monitoring by lenders).

The government‐provided insurance, in this case, eroded market‐based incentives for
financial discipline by lenders.
The insurance literature to date has focused almost exclusively on the ways in which
insurance alters the behavior of insureds, ignoring the much larger group of uninsured
parties. The two problems that have preoccupied insurance scholars are adverse selection and
moral hazard. The former is concerned with the informational advantage that potential
insureds have about themselves, and with securing a sustainable insurance pool that
comprises high‐risk and low‐risk insureds alike. 24 The latter results from the tendency
insurance to incentivize insureds to take less care than they otherwise would, thereby
increasing the insured risk.25 Indeed, scholars of insurance law now believe that many features
of insurance contracts and practices (such as pricing and underwriting) should be understood
as effective efforts to control these problems.26
Our focus is not on the effects of insurance on actual or potential insureds, but rather on third
parties who interact with them. In keeping with tradition, we call this paradoxical effect of
insurance “third party moral hazard.” In cases of third party moral hazard, the risk‐increasing
effects of insurance are not caused by the behavior of the insured policyholder.27 Rather, they
are manifest as an increase in losses generated by the behavior of some third party in response
to insurance.28 To see the distinction, return to the auto accident with which we started our

24
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For a survey of empirical work on adverse selection, see Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for
Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets, 77 J. RISK & INS. 39 (2010); for an accessible theoretical
overview, see Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics in
Pictures 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 115 (2011).
The pioneering reference is Kenneth J. Arrow, supra note 10. Additional refinements were made by
Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. ECON. 541 (1979) and Bengt Holmstrom, Moral
Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979). For an intellectual history of the term, see Tom
Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).
Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L. J. 29 (2012); Omri Ben‐
Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 197 (2012). Cf, Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. OF ECON. 120 (1982)
(demonstrating that (first‐party) moral hazard is unlikely to pose a serious problem in liability
insurance in the context of the standard model of accidents).
In the insurance context, “first party” typically refers to the insured policyholder; the “second party”
is the insurer, and the third party (at least in liability insurance) is the “victim” who is injured by
the policyholder’s negligence. In kidnap insurance, the victim of the kidnapping is the insured herself,
but payment is made to the kidnapper (the perpetrator), so from an accounting perspective, the
terminology still makes sense.
The phrase “third party moral hazard” has been used four times in previous scholarship. See Randall
R. Bovbjerg, Liability and Liability Insurance: Chicken and Egg, Destructive Spiral, or Risk and Reaction?

discussion. Conventional moral hazard would occur if the policyholder had driven more
recklessly after having purchased insurance that limited or eliminated her responsibility for
harms she caused.29 But that was clearly not the problem: it was, instead, the putative self‐
seeking victim who altered his behavior because of the presence of insurance.
Third party moral hazard operates differently from its conventional cousin. Under standard
moral hazard, the chain of causation is straightforward: by removing an insured’s potential
losses, insurance weakens her incentive to avoid the underlying risks. That provides a
motivation for the policyholder to shift or externalize costs to her insurer. A fully‐insured
policyholder has very little reason to be careful (besides caring for his life and limb when he
is unwilling to substitute them by money). After all, what’s the point of taking costly
precautions if all they do is reduce the insurer’s payout in the event of a loss?
By contrast, third party moral hazard is about the creation of (real or ostensible) risks or losses
by actors other than the policyholder, in a way that capitalizes on the presence of insurance
to transfer wealth to the loss‐creator. If first‐party moral hazard is the failure of insureds to
take costly precautions to prevent losses from occurring, third‐party moral hazard involves
the deliberate causing of losses by someone other than the insured policyholder so as to obtain
a payout.

29

72 TEX. L. REV. 1655 (1994) (suggesting that liability insurance might lead to more misbehavior by
third parties); Adrian Vermeule, Congress and the Costs of Information: a Response to Jane Schacter, 89
B.U. L. REV. 677 (2009); Richard A. Ippolito, Freedom to Contract in Medical Care: HMOS, ERISA and
Pegram v. Herdrich, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2001); George A. Nation III, We the People: the Consent of
the Governed in the Twenty‐first Century: the Peopleʹs Unalienable Right to Make Law, 4 DREXEL L. REV.
319 (2012). Other than the first, however, none of these authors treat the idea as more than a catch‐
phrase, and the problem has received virtually no systematic attention from legal scholars or
insurance theorists. For an extended and rigorous theoretical discussion of insurance fraud, which
is related to our subject, see Pierre Picard, Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud, in GEORGES DIONNE
(ED.), HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE (2nd ed, 2013). There are some discussions that touch on the
problem, including Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1629
(1994), Steven W. Pottier & Robert C. Witt, On the Demand for Liability Insurance: An Insurance
Economics Perspective, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1681 (1994), Alexander Fink & Mark Pingle, Kidnap insurance
and its impact on kidnapping outcomes, 160 PUBLIC CHOICE 481 (2014) and Christopher Parsons, Moral
Hazard in Liability Insurance, 28 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INS. ISSUES AND PRACTICE 448 (2003),
which we discuss infra. Clendenin, supra note 8 makes similar arguments with respect to kidnapping
insurance.
There is evidence that supports the existence of this kind of moral hazard. Alma Cohen & Rajeev
Dehejia, The Effect Of Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws On Traffic Fatalities, 47 J. L. &
ECON. 357 (2004) (finding that no‐fault insurance laws increase accident risk).

Third party moral hazard is related to—but distinct from—insurance fraud. Arson constitutes
insurance fraud, for example, but does not meet the definition of third party moral hazard.
Kidnapping is not insurance fraud, but it may be subject to third party moral hazard; the same
can be said for drug companies’ co‐pay coupons, discussed infra, and the reduced incentives
for private monitoring caused by the de facto insurance of “too big to fail” banks.30
It is also important to appreciate that third party moral hazard is not necessarily linked to who
is buying the insurance. Some of our examples can best be understood as third party
insurance, in which the policyholder purchases coverage against losses that she imposes on
others: traditional liability insurance is a classic example. Others are so‐called first party
insurance, where the insured buys coverage for losses to herself (for example, health and
property‐casualty insurance).
Third party moral hazard is important for at least four reasons. First, the presence of third
party moral hazard negates the claim that full insurance is necessarily welfare‐enhancing. It
is well known that full insurance is not optimal when the risk being insured against is
controlled or influenced by the insured. 31 The same logic applies where risk is partially
determined by the behavior of third parties: if insurance generates any added incentives for
risk‐creation, welfare analysis must take these additional insurance‐engendered risks into
account as a social cost of insurance. This is something that standard analysis has completely
failed to do.
Importantly, the magnitude of third‐party moral hazard costs may be large relative to those
caused by first‐party moral hazard, even when most people are honest. Most third‐party
moral hazard involves deliberate loss creation, and the damage done by such conduct can
easily outweigh the losses from mere insurance‐induced negligence: The modest additional
negligence of many may be less harmful than the deliberate loss‐causing activity of a few.

Although this Article is primarily concerned with intentional behavior by third parties in the
presence of insurance, third‐party moral hazard is not limited to intentional behavior; the concept
is broad enough to encompass insurance‐induced third party negligence as well. We are grateful to
Eyal Zamir for pointing this out.
31 As Kenneth Arrow has famously pointed out:
[C]ompetitive insurance markets will yield optimal allocation [only] when the events
insured are not controllable by individual behavior. If the amount of insurance payment is
in any way dependent on a decision of the insured as well as the state of nature, then the
effect [of insurance] is very much the same as any excise tax and optimality will not be
achieved […] by the competitive system.
Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment, 58 AMER. ECON. REV. 537 (1968).
30

A second reason to care about third party moral hazard is that it is not easily handled by the
methods insurers have developed to limit its first‐party cousin. The standard recipe for
combatting traditional moral hazard—and the optimal method for doing so, according to
economic theory—is risk‐sharing in the form of a deductible. 32 When conventional moral
hazard is a problem, insurance contracts will deliberately leave some of the risk with the
insured policyholder, giving her some incentive (“skin in the game”) to take loss‐avoiding
precautions. But the size of the deductible paid by the policyholder is of no consequence to
the uninsured kidnapper or fraudster.
A third reason to care about third party moral hazard is that the techniques that can be used
to control it are themselves costly, and these costs will be passed on to insurance buyers,
making them pay more for insurance. 33 Like any other insurer expense, detecting and
combating third party moral hazard drives a wedge between the actuarially fair premium and
the price consumers actually have to pay. In turn, this reduces the demand for insurance,
limits the efficacy of risk‐spreading, and can even induce follow‐on selection effects. So in
addition to the actual costs of third party moral hazard, there are the direct costs of combating
it, and spillover effects on insurance consumers and the industry as a whole.
Finally, victim precautions against third party moral hazard may have different efficiency
consequences from those taken against conventional risks. Human‐engendered risks,
including third party moral hazard, have a strategic aspect that naturally‐occurring
misfortunes lack. Hurricanes do not decide where to strike based on how flimsy the housing
stock is, but kidnappers presumably do take potential targets’ precautions into account when
choosing their victims. 34 When precautions can divert harmful activity without reducing
overall risk, social and private benefits will diverge. When A builds a higher wall to deter
kidnappers, and as a result they end up kidnapping B instead, the wall will have helped A,
but only by diverting risks somewhere else—it yields little or no gain to society. Private efforts
to deter many human‐engendered strategic risks—even if successful at the individual level—
are therefore not as socially‐beneficial as they appear to be.
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The so‐called “theorem of the deductible” states that “[i]f an insurance company is willing to offer
any insurance policy against loss desired by the buyer at a premium which depends only on the
policyʹs actuarial value, then the policy chosen by a risk‐averting buyer will take the form of 100
percent coverage above a deductible minimum.” Kenneth Arrow, supra note 10 at 969. Besides
deductibles, there are many other well‐known strategies for controlling conventional moral hazard,
but most are ineffective against third party moral hazard. For discussion, see Part III, infra.
In insurance parlance, the difference between the pure risk premium and the price charged to
consumer is called the insurance “load.”
The displacement/diversionary effects of insurance in the context of human‐caused harms were first
noted by Jack Hirshleifer, War Damage Insurance, 35 REV. ECON. & STAT. 144 (1953).

For these reasons, third party moral hazard presents a formidable challenge to insurers,
lawmakers and society at large. Importantly, our characterization of the unique features of
third party moral hazard provides a blueprint for how the problem should be addressed,
which leads us to the normative contribution of this Article. We propose a three‐pronged
response to the problem. First, insurers are not completely helpless in the face of third‐party
moral hazard. Insurance contracts can be used to ameliorate the problem. True, insureds do
not control the actions of third parties, but they can take precautions to reduce their
vulnerability to intentional actions by strangers. For example, insurers can, and in some
countries do, require or incentivize insureds to install dash cameras as part of the insurance
contract. Dash cams don’t just track the actions of insureds; they also monitor the activities of
those who interact with them. Individual insurance companies cannot bear the high costs of
developing preventive technologies on their own, and must rely on the technology market for
help. As is often the case, the development of monitoring technologies and preventive devices
may be aided by regulatory actions.
This brings us to the second intervention. Supra‐contractual methods are required to deter the
behavior of third‐party risk‐creators. The problem requires action by police forces or
regulators. Criminal sanctions and punitive damages are necessary to achieve effective
deterrence of intentional risk‐ or loss‐causing behavior.
Finally, we advocate using qui tam suits to combat third party moral hazard. Filed by a single
plaintiff on behalf of many, qui tam suits can deter risk‐ and loss‐causing behavior when
insurers may not have an incentive to monitor or to sue by encouraging reporting and actions
by members of the public. And they can accomplish this without unduly empowering insurers
in disputes with policyholders, while simultaneously disrupting the loss‐causing enterprise.
The rest of this Article unfolds in three parts. In Part I, we document the phenomenon of third
party moral hazard across a wide range of insurance settings, analyze its scope and assessing
its social costs. In Part II, we investigate the causes of the phenomenon and suggest four
different dynamics that can explain why it is so prevalent. In Part III, we delve into potential
policy responses to the problems posed by third party moral hazard. While insurers have an
array of mechanisms for controlling first party moral hazard, we show that most of those
mechanisms cannot resolve the problem of losses caused by third parties. We then offer a
comprehensive set of technological, criminal and procedural interventions that can address
the problem more effectively.
I. THIRD PARTY MORAL HAZARD IN ACTION

In this Part, we discuss the existence and empirical significance of third party moral hazard
in several domains of insurance. Since the phenomenon has largely managed to escape the
probing gaze of scholars and has not been systematically analyzed to date, it is difficult to
assess the extent of third party moral hazard.35 Moreover, since most insurance data are kept
in the hands of insurers and much of third party moral hazard is illegal or morally dubious,
it is impossible to pin down with any degree of precision the cost it imposes on society. Still,
we offer abundant evidence that the phenomenon is worth paying attention.

A. Liability Insurance

1. General Considerations and Welfare Analysis
Liability insurance pays others (third parties) for losses that an insured policyholder has
imposed on them and for which the insured could be held legally responsible. By virtue of
this structure, liability insurance is an obvious place to look for third party moral hazard, since
it directs funds not to policyholders themselves, but to those claiming to have been injured by
them.
We stress that in the context of liability insurance, third party moral hazard has ambiguous
welfare consequences.36 In standard models of liability insurance, it is implicitly assumed that
all and only those plaintiffs with meritorious claims bring suit. From that baseline, any
increase in litigation generated by the presence of insurance is welfare‐reducing, since by
assumption, the additional lawsuits would be without merit.
But in a world where information is incomplete, lawsuits are expensive to bring, defendants
may be judgment proof, capital markets are imperfect, courts sometimes make errors,
plaintiffs are risk averse, and there are strong social norms against complaining, not everyone
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But see sources cited supra note 28.
A major theme of KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY (2008) is that liability insurance
actually makes the tort system possible by creating incentives for injured victims to sue. Without it,
there would be very little reward for successful litigants, and no reason to bring even meritorious
suits.

who is injured will actually choose to bring a lawsuit. 37 (Of course, none of these
considerations preclude those who have not actually been injured from filing as well.38)
If introducing liability insurance increases the number of meritorious lawsuits brought,
insurance‐induced litigation would presumptively be welfare‐enhancing. This is a key
normative difference between third party moral hazard in litigation and, for example,
kidnapping. The optimal amount of kidnapping is zero, so all insurance‐induced kidnaps are
welfare‐reducing. But there are almost certainly “good” lawsuits that are never actually filed.
As a result, insurance‐induced litigation may be welfare‐enhancing (or reducing), depending
on whether it generates more good suits than bad ones, and on the relative costs and benefits
of each. Ultimately, it is the net effect of liability insurance that is relevant for welfare analysis,
and that effect has an ambiguous sign.
Liability insurance can create third party moral hazard if it raises the expected return to filing
a claim.39 There are several ways this could occur. The simplest story is based on deep pockets
and wealth constraints: liability insurance will often allow successful claimants to collect more
than would be possible if injurers had to pay out of their own pockets.40 Suppose X is accused
of causing $100,000 in harm, but has wealth of only $10,000. A lawsuit costs $5,000 to bring
and $5,000 to defend, and has a 10 percent chance of success. In the absence of insurance, the
suit has an expected value to the plaintiff of
EV = 10% ✕ ($10,000 ‐ $5,000) + 90%✕0 ‐ $5,000 = ‐$4,500.
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See generally, Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis—Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 443 (1987);
William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming…, 15 L. & SOCI. REV. 631 (1980‐1981). For example, one careful study of
medical malpractice found that of 1047 patients sampled at one academic hospital, 17.7 percent (185)
experienced at least one serious adverse event (defined as causing temporary physical disability, or
worse) during their stay. But only 1.2 percent of patients (13) made any claim for compensation.
That amounts to only 7% of those who were injured. Lori B. Andrews et al., An Alternative Strategy
for Studying Adverse Events in Medical Care, 349 LANCET 309, 311 (1997).
Sachin S. Pandya & Peter Siegelman, Underclaiming and Overclaiming: Bringing Law Back Into the
Dispute Pyramid, 38 L. & SOC. INQ. 836 (2013).
We are unaware of any theoretical treatment of the issues. Steven Shavell, supra note 23 pioneered
the analysis of moral hazard in liability insurance, but does not discuss whether insurance can
increase the volume of false claims.
This is just the flip‐side of the well‐known judgment proof problem that occurs when the harm that
injurers cause is greater than their wealth, which acts as an upper bound on their ability to pay.
Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986).

If instead the injurer is fully insured (including defense costs), then the expected value of the
lawsuit becomes $5,000. While plaintiffs may find that negative expected value suits are worth
bringing in some circumstances,41 the return from pursuing litigation is higher in the presence
of insurance than without it (other things equal).
Insurance could also generate an increase in (false) claims of liability if insurers have less
incentive or ability to detect such claims than would an uninsured individual defendant. And
under some circumstances, insurers might be willing to spend less to defend a lawsuit (or
would be more willing to settle) than an individual defendant. In the following paragraphs,
we demonstrate this dynamic in action in the context of Directors’ & Officers’ liability
insurance and no‐fault automobile insurance.

2. Directors & Officers (D&O) Liability Insurance
Directors and Officers (“D&O”) liability insurance protects corporate officials, as well as the
corporation itself, against potential liability arising from negligent actions and omissions that
harm the corporation.42 D&O liability insurance pervades the corporate world43 and covers in
virtually all public corporations in U.S. and Canada.44 While D&O insurance is purchased by
corporations, it primarily benefits corporate officials by providing them reimbursement for
costs and payments incurred in litigation against them. By law, D&O liability insurance is
only applicable to non‐intentional breaches of the duty of care. As Tom Baker and Sean
Griffith explain, it excludes “claims involving fraud or personal enrichment, claims either
noticed or pending prior to the commencement of the policy period and claims between
insured persons.”45
Although D&O liability insurance also protects corporate officials from suits brought against
them by the corporation, its principal effect is to protect directors and officers from derivative
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STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 419‐23 (2004).
See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ &
Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1801 (2007) (“D&O insurance protects corporate officers
and directors and the corporation itself from liabilities arising as a result of the conduct of directors
and officers in their official capacity.”).
Tom Baker & Sean Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence From the Directors’ and
Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 487 (2007) (noting that “[n]early all public
corporations purchase D&O policies.”).
TILLINGHAST TOWERS PERRIN, 2005 DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY SURVEY, 20 fig. 21 (2006).
Baker and Griffith, supra note 39, at 1804‐05.

suits brought by shareholders.46 In principle, the duty of care is owed to the corporation, and
if it is breached by an official, the corporation may sue her. Corporations, however, are
reluctant to sue their officials. To remedy this problem, corporate law empowers individual
shareholders to sue on the corporation’s behalf. For this reason, such suits are known as
derivative shareholders’ suits. By contrast to the corporation, individual shareholders have
no qualms about suing corporate officials. On the contrary, they have strong monetary
incentives to file such suits.47 Hence, D&O liability insurance primarily covers directors and
officers against the risk of monetary liability arising from suits brought by shareholders.48 In
addition to sheltering directors and officers from derivative suits that stem from breaches of
the duty of care, D&O liability insurance also protects them in the case of securities class
actions.
Champions of D&O liability insurance contend that it lowers “the cost of compensating risk‐
averse directors and officers and encourages them to take appropriate business risks.” 49
Furthermore, they emphasize the salutary effects of insurance on firm management and
corporate governance. As Clifford Holderness wrote:
Monitoring services provided by the insurance convey distinct benefits to both the
insurer and the client company’s shareholders. They reduce the insurer’s exposure,
and they encourage directors and officers to act in the shareholders’ interests.
Moreover, these services, which supplement other monitoring efforts, will be
provided even if insurance shifts no risk beyond what is shifted by indemnification,
because the policies reimburse companies for their indemnification payments.50

Detractors of D&O liability insurance maintain “that liability insurance largely nullifies the
disciplining potential of litigation, causing directors and officers to be less attentive to their
duties to shareholders.”51
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Claims and “Reflective Loss” in English Company Law, 37 INT’L LAW. 137, 137 (2003) (describing the
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(1990).
Id. at 118.
Id. at 116. This is, of course, a form of conventional (first‐party) moral hazard: insured directors face
less or no liability risk, and hence have less incentive to be careful to avoid harms to others.

Naturally, the key question for present purposes is whether the existence of D&O liability
insurance creates a third party moral hazard in the form of enhanced litigation. At first blush,
it seems clear that the answer is yes.52 After all, the prevalent belief among legal scholars is
that derivative litigation rates are higher in the U.S. than in other countries, due, in part, to
the broad availability of D&O liability insurance. Echoing this conventional wisdom, Dan
Puchniak listed “the high levels of directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance,” as one of
the principal factors that contribute to the high rate of derivative litigation in the U.S.53
Studies from other countries seem to suggest the same conclusion. For example, Mark West
studied the spike in derivative litigation in Japan in the 1990s. West suggested that the
presence of insurance was the main driver of the litigation trend.54 He suggested, however,
that the causal mechanism was not necessarily third party moral hazard, but rather standard
moral hazard: corporate directors and officers became less circumspect in the fulfillment of
their duties once they knew they were insured.55
Economists have expressed the same view. Sanjai Bhagat, James A. Brickley & Jeffrey L. Coles
wrote that “[w]ithout insurance, in a judgment against the manager damages may easily
exceed the managerʹs wealth. The derivative suit has somewhat limited value if it cannot
achieve its purpose: the reimbursement of the corporation for losses due to negligence or
malfeasance.”56 Similarly, Maria Gutierrez noted that “[w]hen the directorʹs wealth is low, the
incentives for the shareholders to sue can be maintained only through the adoption of an
insurance policy (that guarantees the shareholders will receive the full amount of the damage
award).”57
A careful examination of the relationship between the presence D&O insurance and derivative
litigation rates reveals a more nuanced picture, however. The high rate of derivative litigation
in the U.S., relative to other countries, cannot prove, on its own, that D&O liability insurance
generates a third party moral hazard problem. Nor can the fact that companies with high D&O
liability insurance coverage get sued more often. There are three possible explanations for the
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Id. at 376.
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531 (2003). See also Chen Lin, Michah S. Officer & Hong Zou, Directorsʹ and Officers Liability Insurance
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fact that firms with D&O liability insurance are sued more often. The first is standard moral
hazard. Directors and managers who have insurance tend to be less diligent in the
performance of their obligations. The second is that firms with high coverage are more poorly
managed to begin with. It is for this reason that such firms spend a lot on D&O liability
insurance. This is a classic adverse selection story:58 the higher premia reflect the higher risk,
and the subsequent lawsuits merely prove that point. The third explanation is third‐party
moral hazard.
It should be noted that the three explanations are not mutually exclusive; they can clearly co‐
exist and, as we will show, there are empirical studies that provide support for each. For
example, a recent study by Stuart Gillan and Christine Panasian reports that firms with high
D&O liability insurance are indeed more likely to be involved in litigation. In exploring the
root cause for the correlation, Gillan and Panasian arrive at the tentative conclusion that “the
association we find is more likely attributable to opportunism or moral hazard in the
managers’ actions.”59 The article did not consider the third party moral hazard explanation,
however.
A study by John Core that used data on Canadian corporations also reported significant
correlation between D&O insurance premia and “the quality of firms’ governance.” 60 In
analyzing the reasons for this finding, Core endorses the second explanation, i.e., that higher
D&O liability insurance is indicative of poor governance structures. Here, too, we found no
reference to the third party moral hazard hypothesis.
Other empirical studies are consistent with the third party moral hazard hypothesis. Tom
Baker and Sean Griffith examined the elements that affect settlements of class actions. They
use a qualitative research methodology, i.e., interviews with industry participants responsible
for settling securities cases. While Baker and Griffith do not focus on third party moral hazard
or even mention the term, the answers to their questions suggest that industry participants
view D&O insurance as a critical element that shapes their litigation strategy. As one
respondent, a claims head, asserted: “I think it is easier to get money out of an insurance
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carrier than it is out of an insured. Why? Because it is a third party’s money.”61 Baker and
Griffith further reported that another respondent, a plaintiff’s lawyer, was far more specific
about the effect of D&O liability insurance on plaintiffs’ motivation to sue, explaining that
plaintiffs’ lawyers “sue for insurance.”62
Finally, in a 2018 article, Donelson, et al. reported a strong correlation between firms’ levels
of D&O insurance and their likelihood of being involved in securities litigation.63 The study
takes advantage of a unique feature of New York law that mandates disclosure of D&O
insurance premia. No such requirement exists in the law of other states. The study then
compares the exposure to securities litigation of New York firms and non‐New York firms.
Donelson et al. note that information about D&O premia have two possible effects on
litigation: First, high premia can signal to lawyers a potential for high settlement rates. Second,
high premia may indicate that the insurer thought that the firm represented a high legal risk.
Analyzing a large database of class action brought against firms between 1998 and 2010, they
found that “the relation between premiums and litigation is stronger for firms incorporated
in New York, compared to firms incorporated elsewhere. As this relation is based on premium
levels (rather than disclosure presence), this implies that the disclosure content affects
litigation.”64
Donelson et al. suggested that their “results provide a more nuanced interpretation of prior
D&O insurance research.” 65 In particular, they distinguished their findings from those of
Gillan and Panasian, explaining that knowledge of D&O liability premia “may partially drive
the relation between premiums and litigation.”66 Furthermore, they estimated that if D&O
premia were known in all states, it would have led to an increase of 12 to 19 percent in
securities class‐action litigation over the period they studied.67 The authors also highlighted
the potential costs of non‐meritorious lawsuits, explaining that “[i]n addition to potential costs
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of non‐meritorious litigation, both in terms of lawyer fees, nuisance settlements for cases that
survive a motion to dismiss, and lost managerial time, excessive selection of non‐meritorious
cases would undermine the credibility of the U.S. securities litigation system.”68
In light of these findings, it appears that the availability of D&O liability insurance has
played a role in fomenting derivative litigation against corporate executives. It is
likewise clear that the risk of litigation is positively correlated with coverage amounts.
Donelson et al. suggest that the non‐meritorious claims arising from third party moral
hazard threaten the integrity of our securities system. We stop short of endorsing this
conclusion, but we believe that the problem is real.
3. No‐Fault Automobile Insurance
No‐fault automobile insurance is designed to simplify the payment of lower‐value claims
and reduce claims‐processing costs. Rather than litigating who was at fault in smaller
claims, no‐fault makes a policyholder’s own insurer responsible for compensating him
or her. In New York, for example, medical and other expenses totaling less than $50,000
are covered by each insured’s (mandatory) Personal Injury Policy (PIP). More serious
injuries can be litigated in the usual manner, with the injurer’s insurer responsible for
compensating the victim.
Even though no‐fault operates as first‐party insurance, it offers substantial opportunities
for third party moral hazard. The extent of the problem is hard to assess. Data are
difficult to obtain and—if they are from insurers—almost impossible to verify. But there
is abundant anecdotal evidence demonstrating elaborate and well‐organized schemes to
falsify and exaggerate claims, run as sophisticated criminal enterprises in several states.69
According to testimony by a Michigan doctor who ran an MRI facility outside of Detroit,
for example, a prominent “TV lawyer,” Mike Morse, repeatedly leaned on him to
exaggerate the severity of injuries detected in MRI scans of patients referred to him by
Morse.70 The doctor explained that Morse pressured him to “alter[ ] MRIs or over‐read
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to make them look more abnormal. 71 I understood he wanted reads with abnormal
results to increase the value of his clients’ bodily injury claims, and his own fees … ”72 A
network of chiropractors and physical therapists was also used to overbill for treatments
and make and receive referrals.73
A similar pattern was documented in a criminal complaint against more than two dozen
defendants filed by the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York in
2015. Quoting the indictment:
In order to take advantage of the patient‐friendly provisions of the [New York]
No‐Fault Law, numerous medical clinics were created solely to defraud
insurance companies under the No‐Fault Law (the ʺNo‐Fault Clinicsʺ). While
purporting to be legitimate medical care clinics specializing in treating the
Patients, the No‐Fault Clinics were, in fact, medical fraud mills that routinely
billed automobile insurance companies under the No Fault Law for medical
treatments that were either (i) never provided and/or (ii) unnecessary, because
the Patients did not medically need the treatments.74

Although New York law requires that medical clinics be “owned, operated and
controlled” by a licensed medical practitioner (a doctor), the defendants apparently hired
doctors to serve as fronts for the clinics, while secretly owning and controlling the
operations of the clinics themselves. 75 The indictment goes on to describe additional
layers of fraud: the clinics would provide referrals for “excessive and unnecessary
medical treatments” to lower‐level entities called ʺModality Clinics.ʺ These clinics
provided further fraudulent medical treatments and supplies (including “acupuncture,
chiropractic medicine, physical therapy, neurology, psychology, magnetic resonance
imagings, x‐rays, range of motion, outcome assessment, functional capacity, pain
management, orthopedics, audiology, manipulation under anesthesia, and durable
medical equipment” 76 ) for which they billed insurers and paid cash kickbacks for
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(JPO)
(no
date),
available
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‐
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Id. at 5.
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referrals to the originating clinics. 77 The no‐fault clinics also employed “runners”
(recruiters) who were paid $2,000‐$3,000 per patient brought into the clinic (depending
on the quality of the accident report filed with the patient’s injury).78
This was not the only such organized scheme. A 2018 article in the New York Times
reported that “countless phony companies were cropping up [in the early 2000’s] to
exploit so‐called no‐fault auto insurance laws in New York.”79 According to the news
story:
The no‐fault insurance schemes, which were often masterminded by organized
crime figures from the former Soviet Union, all followed a basic template.
Staged or exaggerated car accidents were used to generate a tidal wave of
“patients.” Transportation companies then took the patients—often low‐level
criminals—to what in many instances were sham medical clinics, diagnostic
testing offices, and acupuncture and physical therapy offices. Billing companies
were created to collect money from insurers, and management companies then
siphoned the funds out to the scheme’s operators. Some operators were so bold
that they sued insurers that had stopped paying after they realized they were
being defrauded.80

In the aftermath of a thorough investigation, hundreds of indictments were brought
against physicians, business proprietors and other involved parties.
Estimates of the magnitude of third party moral hazard in no‐fault insurance vary
substantially. A widely‐cited insurance industry report put no‐fault fraud losses in New
York at $230‐$240 million in 2009. 81 But others have disputed that estimate, and the
details of the calculation never seem to have been made public, so it is difficult to verify.82
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According to one (admittedly partisan) source:
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According to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, the industry’s
incurred losses on PIP policies in New York in 2009 amounted to $1.6 billion.83 So the
$240 million estimate for no‐fault fraud (almost all of which is probably third party moral
hazard) amounts to 15 percent of all losses; opponents have suggested that this is too
high by a factor of 2, but even if we put the figure at 7.5 percent, it translates to a loss of
$120 million.
B. Health Insurance
The tangled relationships among insurers, individual policyholders, drug companies, doctors,
and hospitals are rife with examples of third parties creating or exaggerating expenses so as
to take advantage of what insurance will pay for. Indeed, the malign effects of third‐party
moral hazard in health care are the major theme of a recent 550‐page book by legal scholars
Charles Silver and David Hyman.84 As a former Dean of Harvard Medical school put it in the
forward to their book, the “root cause[ ]” of waste and excessive spending in healthcare is “the
. . . overreliance on insurance and other forms of third party payment” to cover medical
expenses.85 In Silver and Hyman’s view, health care is all about third party moral hazard writ
large: “health care is expensive because it is insured. . . . Insurance makes healthcare more
expensive than it would be if people paid for it themselves.”86
Economists have long recognized the potential for conventional moral hazard in health care.87
It has taken the economics profession a long time, however, to get past its fixation on the idea
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suspective [sic] fraud sounds like and is a lot, it . . . [amounts to] roughly 1 percent of [the $9.9 billion
in] premium dollars collected by NY auto insurers [in 2009].
Hearing on Ways to Reduce the Incidents of No‐fault Auto Insurance Fraud before York State Senate
Standing Committee on Insurance (2011) (statement of Stuart Israel (President, New Yorkers for FAIR
Auto Reform)) https://www.nysenate.gov/calendar/public‐hearings/april‐26‐2011/examine‐ways‐
reduce‐incidence‐no‐fault‐auto‐insurance‐fraud.
NAIC, Auto Insurance Database Report, 108 Table 17B, 108 (2009‐10),
CHARLES SILVER & DAVID HYMAN, OVERCHARGED: WHY AMERICANS PAY TOO MUCH FOR HEALTH
CARE (2018).
Jeffrey S. Flier, Forward, in OVERCHARGED: WHY AMERICANS PAY TOO MUCH FOR HEALTH CARE , Id.
at xx.
Silver and Hyman, _____ at 295 (emphasis in original). Of course, even if it is true, that is not the
end of the story—insurance clearly has substantial benefits from risk‐spreading and access‐to‐care
that cannot be ignored.
In fact, the first formal economic analysis of moral hazard was in the context of medical care. Arrow,
supra note 10.

that people with insurance go to the doctor too often,88 and to start thinking about the issues
that arise because third parties—doctors, hospitals, drug companies, and providers of
ancillary services—have figured out how to squeeze funds from insurers in a more‐
sophisticated and less‐blatant version of the automobile insurance scam with which we began
this Article.89
Perhaps the best indicator of the magnitude of third party moral hazard in health care is that
in writing the chapter on health care fraud, Silver and Hyman decided to “ignore any
[examples] that didn’t involve at least $500 million in ill gotten gains[, and] [e]ven so, . . . had
more material than [they] could use.”90
Silver and Hyman argue that the solution to third party moral hazard problems is increased
reliance on so‐called consumer‐driven healthcare. But one needn’t agree with their proposed
solution to acknowledge their diagnosis of (part of) the problem. In the next sections, we turn
our attention to two specific examples of third party moral hazard. There are many more.
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There is certainly evidence for the existence of conventional moral hazard, dating from a pioneering
experiment conducted by the RAND Corporation in the early 1970’s. See W. G. Manning et al., Health
Insurance and The Demand For Medical Care: Evidence From A Randomized Experiment 77 AMER. ECON.
REV. 251 (1987). More recently, Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, Moral Hazard in Health Insurance:
What We Know and How We Know It, 16 J. EUR. ECON. ASSOC. 957 (2018), conclude that there is strong
empirical evidence for moral hazard in health care: “individuals increase their healthcare utilization
when the price they have to pay for it is lower.” But these effects turn out to be quite trivial compared
to the other sources of waste in health care. Moreover, some insurance‐induced demand for
healthcare is actually welfare‐enhancing. We discuss this issue in more detail in part II.A, infra.
This is somewhat ironic, since it is precisely such non‐market institutions and norms that Kenneth
Arrow suggested—in response to Mark Pauly’s critique of his pioneering article—could serve as
vital checks on conventional first‐party moral hazard in health care. Arrow points out that
conventional moral hazard leads patients to demand more care than is optimal. To prevent such
overuse, he notes, it makes sense to ration care; and one way to accomplish that is to rely on the
professional ethics of physicians not to prescribe frivolously expensive cost of treatment, at least
where the gain is primarily in comfort or luxury rather than in health proper. . . . One of the
characteristics of a successful economic system is that the relations of trust and confidence between
principal and agent are sufficiently strong so that the agent will not cheat even though it may be
ʺrational economic behaviorʺ to do so. Arrow, supra note 28, at 538.
Silver and Hyman, supra note 80, at xvi.

1.

Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRIs)

Excessive use of medical imaging has been characterized as one of the largest sources of
unnecessary procedures in US healthcare.91 As Horwitz et al. point out, imaging is painless to
the patient and highly profitable for the provider; it also helps doctors avoid the possibility of
litigation, all of which provide reasons for its overuse.92 The result is that even though “all
relevant specialty society guidelines support initial management without imaging for patients
with uncomplicated low‐back pain, many physicians continue to order routine imaging
without a clear clinical indication.”93 And according to a recent survey, insurance is clearly
implicated in the overuse of MRIs.94
Distinguishing first‐party moral hazard from third party moral hazard in this context is not
completely straightforward. Some overuse of MRIs, and some of the failure to obtain them
from the lowest‐cost provider, can be attributed to patients themselves. A recent study
demonstrates, for example, that even when given a price comparison tool, “[m]any patients
[go] to very expensive providers when lower‐priced options with equal quality are
available.”95 But the study also shows that patients overwhelmingly get their MRIs at the site
their doctors recommend, even when the price is dramatically higher than at easily available
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“Excessive imaging is one of the most common suggestions about potentially unnecessary
procedures in the Choosing Widely compendium of health care savings opportunities.” Jill R.
Horwitz, Austin Nichols, Carrie Colla, & David M. Cutler, Technology Regulation Reconsidered: The
Effects of Certificate of Need on MRI Access, Quality, and Cost, 1 (2016) (unpublished paper, on file with
authors, citing Nancy E. Morden, et al, Choosing Wisely – The Politics and Economics of Labeling Low‐
Value Services, 370 N. ENGL J. MED. 589 (2014) (reporting results of surveys of medical specialists on
which services are particularly low‐value).
Horwitz et al, id, consider a situation where one state (e.g., Michigan) regulates MRI providers by
requiring them to obtain a “certificate of need” (regulatory approval based on the absence of other
nearby providers), while a neighboring state (Ohio) does not. They find that there are many more
providers of MRI services located on the Ohio side of the Ohio/Michigan border than on the
Michigan side. But that’s not all. Although the authors are careful to point out the limits of their
findings, their evidence suggests that more unnecessary MRIs are being done in unregulated states.
And since there are probably many unnecessary MRIs done in regulated states, we should be quite
confident that MRI providers (in combination with doctors) are driving up costs by generating
unneeded imaging.
Sarah Jane Reed & Steven Pearson, Imaging for Nonspecific Low Back Pain, INSTIT. FOR CLINICAL &
ECON. REV., 1, 4 (2015). [emphasis added]
Id.
Austin Frakt, Why Don’t We Shop for Health Care? Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2018 at B4 (quoting
Yale health economist Zack Cooper).

alternatives.96 And doctors associated with hospitals tend to recommend their own hospital’s
MRI service, although on average a hospital MRI costs more than twice as much as one
provided at an imaging center (with no quality differential).
2.

Copay Coupons for Branded Drugs

Health insurers have an obvious interest in incentivizing patients (and their doctors) to choose
lower‐cost generic drugs instead of branded drugs that are medically identical. One
mechanism used to create such incentives has been to set a higher copayment by the patient
if she chooses the branded drug instead of the generic alternative. As health economist Austin
Frakt explains,
[l]et’s say that I needed the brand drug Effexor XR, used to treat depression and
anxiety disorders. It would cost me at least $65 a month on my health insurance
plan. It retails for about twice that amount, and the difference [i.e., another $65]
would be picked up by my insurer. But the generic version, Venlafaxine, would cost
my insurer far less, and my co‐payment would be only $10 per month.97

Manufacturers of branded drugs have figured out a way to subvert this incentive, however—
copay coupons. The idea is simple. The patient is given a coupon that covers $55 of the
branded copay, so that she then faces the same net cost for the branded product as for the $10
generic drug. Subsidizing consumers to the tune of a $55 copay can be highly profitable for
the manufacturer: in the above example, the seller makes an additional sale at $130 by
diverting the consumer from a generic drug, at the cost of the $55 copayment, for a profit of
$75.
The effects of copay coupons are large and negative, according to a recent study: “[C]oupons
increase branded sales by 60+ percent, entirely by reducing the sales of bioequivalent
generics.”98 Copay coupons do not simply divert customers from cheaper generic substitutes
96
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See Michael Chernew et al, Are Health Care Services Shoppable? Evidence from the Consumption of Lower‐
Limb
MRI
Scans
(ISPS
Working
Paper
No.
24869,
2018),
available
at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24869, last visited July 31, 2018. For example, in some markets, prices
can differ by a factor of 7.5. Merely using the lowest priced MRI service that is no further away than
the one they actually chose would save patients an average of 36%.
Austin Frakt, When a Drug Coupon Helps You But Hurts Fellow Patients, N.Y. TIMES, September 25,
2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/upshot/when‐a‐drug‐coupon‐helps‐you‐but‐hurts‐
fellow‐citizens.html. Frakt is reporting on the original work of health economist Leemore Dafny and
co‐authors. See, Leemore Dafny, Christopher Ody, & Matt Schmitt, When Discounts Raise Costs: The
Effect of Copay Coupons on Generic Utilization, 9 AMER. ECON. J. ECON. POL’Y 91 (2017).
Id. at 91.

to branded alternatives, however. They also enable higher prices: the consumers’ “cost with
the coupon holds the consumers’ prices fixed at a low level. That allows the manufacturer to
raise the overall price without losing sales. This raises spending, too, but for the insurer.”99
According to the best recent evidence, copay coupons cause several billion dollars in
additional spending per year.100
Copay coupons are just a particularly compelling example of drug companies’ exploitation of
insurance to charge higher prices. As health economist David Besanko and co‐authors
demonstrate in a recent working paper, the presence of insurance has enabled manufacturers
of oral chemotherapy drugs to raise prices; and the higher prices are greater than many
estimates of the additional value they create for consumers.101
C. Kidnapping and Related Problems

1. Kidnapping and Insurance: Theory
The general economics of kidnapping has been the subject of considerable analysis, both
empirical and theoretical.102 There is very little on the impact of insurance, however. A key
finding of most theoretical models is that the number or frequency of kidnappings will
depend on the average amount that victims are willing and able to pay. In other words, there
is an upward‐sloping supply of kidnaps, so that the higher the expected ransom, the greater
the number of kidnappings.103
The question of interest to us is whether the presence of insurance enhances victims’
willingness or ability to pay ransoms. If so, the availability of insurance would likely cause
99
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Frakt, supra note 115.
Dafny, supra note 90.
David Besanko, David Dranove, & Craig Garthwaite, Insurance and the High Prices of Pharmaceuticals,
(National Bureau of Economic Research.
Working Paper No. 22353, 2016)
https://www.nber.org/papers/w22353.pdf.
Reinhard Selten apparently used kidnapping to motivate the idea of a sub‐game perfect equilibrium
in game theory, for which he was subsequently awarded a Nobel prize. See Marco Vannini, Claudio
Detotto, & Bryan McCannon, Ransom Kidnapping, in JURGEN BACKHAUS, ED. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
& ECONOMICS 5(2015) (citing Selten’s 1976 unpublished working paper). Available at
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273574256_Ransom_Kidnapping; see also Alexander Fink
& Mark Pingle, supra note 25.
Vannini, id, (summarizing conclusions of the Selten model of bargaining between kidnapper and
victim). Of course, this is an “all else equal” result. And supply might be price‐insensitive or
“inelastic,” but that is almost certainly a special case.

more kidnaps. Common sense would seem to suggest an affirmative answer. As Fink and
Pingle point out: 104
The provision of kidnap insurance might have an effect on the probability that
kidnappings are contemplated. For instance, a potential kidnapper might hear about
a successful exchange of a victim for ransom that may have been facilitated with the
aid of an insurance company, or a potential kidnapper might conclude from the
presence of a kidnap insurance market that his potential victims are on average
willing to pay more ransom compared to the situation when no kidnap insurance
market exists.105

Indeed, in Fink & Pingle’s game theoretic model, “the existence of a competitive insurance
market [always] increases the maximum [ransom] demand a family is willing to pay.” The
size of the supply‐side response to this increase is left open, however.106 And as we will discuss
below, these results need not obtain in models that allow for certain institutional innovations.
2. Kidnapping & Insurance: Empirical Evidence
The available empirical evidence on whether the presence of insurance actually increases
kidnappings is unfortunately quite weak, since it is virtually impossible to find exogenous
changes in the availability of kidnap insurance that would be required to make a valid
inference about its effects. 107 Venezuela, Colombia, and Italy have all banned kidnap
insurance at one time or another,108 but these legal interventions were much broader than
merely limiting or banning insurance. That makes it difficult to assign responsibility for any

Fink & Pingle, supra note 25 at 491. In addition to the quantity of kidnappings, insurance might also
have a separate effect on average kidnap “severity” —for example, the fatality rate—discussed infra.
105 Id. In their model, the positive effect of insurance on the volume of kidnapping occurs whenever
“insurance increases [victims’] maximum ransom offer,” which in turn depends on some technical
conditions. Even if insurance increases total kidnappings, it might still reduce fatal kidnappings,
since higher ransom payments “push[ ] [some victim] offers above the net willingness to kill of the
marginal kidnapper, reducing the fraction of fatal kidnappings.” Id. at 493. The net effect on the total
volume of fatal kidnappings depends on the relative size of the kidnap‐increasing and fatality‐
reducing effects.
106 Id. at 490. As the authors point out, higher willingness to pay will not lead to an increase in kidnaps
if all potential kidnaps “were always contemplated by the potential kidnapper.” Id.
107 For example, if countries ban kidnap insurance only when kidnappings are unusually bad—as
seems likely—then kidnappings will tend to decline after the adoption of an anti‐kidnapping
insurance law purely by chance (even if the law actually had no effect). Quantitatively sophisticated
readers will recognize this as an example of the well‐known regression fallacy.
108 Vannini et al supra note 101 at 8.
104

subsequent changes in kidnappings to insurance bans, as opposed to any of the other forces
in play. Some historical case studies are worth considering, however.
Italy has had a long history of kidnappings. “[I]n the period 1960–2000, . . . [there were] 592
cases and an average of 14.4 abductions per year, [which] had a dramatic impact and placed
the country at the top of the worldwide kidnapping hotspots throughout the 1970s and most
of the 1980s.” 109 In 1991, Italy reacted to its large and growing kidnapping problem by
imposing severe restrictions on ransom payments. (At the same time, it also banned private
negotiations between kidnappers and victims and imposed an automatic freeze on the
victim’s families’ assets whenever a kidnap was reported; any subsequent ransom payments
had to be approved by state prosecutors, who were reluctant to authorize such transactions.110)
Reported kidnap volume fell substantially after the law went into effect.111
Like Italy, Colombia has also seen widespread kidnappings. According to one US court,
Columbian “abductions for ransom [were] literally everyday occurrences—1,717 abductions,
or approximately 5 per day, occurred in 1991, while 1,320 abductions, or almost 4 per day,
occurred in 1992.”112
The presence of insurance was likely a factor in Colombian kidnappings. According to a recent
report by a peace activist group, “[i]t has been reported that [Colombian] guerrillas sometimes
run the names of the detained persons through a laptop to check out what they are worth, and
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Vannini et al, supra note 101 at 4.
Celestine Bohlen, Italian Ban on Paying Kidnappers Stirs Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
1998,https://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/01/world/italian‐ban‐on‐paying‐kidnappers‐stirs‐
anger.html. “[U]nder Italian law, families are barred from paying ransom or negotiating with
kidnappers, except with the permission of a prosecutor and the cooperation of the police.
[Moreover, the law] imposes an automatic and obligatory freeze on assets belonging to the
kidnapped victimʹs family.” There was already an anti‐kidnapping statute in force from 1974.
Vannini et al, supra note 101 at 9.
Bohlen, Id., reports that between 1969 and 1991, Italy experienced roughly 650 reported kidnappings
(about 30 per year), while in the seven year period between 1991 and 1998, there were only 38
reported kidnappings (about 5.5 per year). Of course, the raw numbers do not demonstrate that the
law itself was responsible for the drop in kidnappings; among other things, it may be have been the
case that making ransom payment illegal simply led to a drop in the rate at which kidnaps were
reported to the police.
Hargrove v. Underwriters at Lloydʹs, London, 937 F. Supp. 595, 600 (S.D. Tex. 1996). Another US
court concluded that kidnappings for ransom in Colombia were “a form of fundraising” and were
“virtually day to day news.” Curtis v. Beatrice Foods Co., 481 F.Supp. 1275, 1278 (S.D.N.Y). 633 F.2d
203 (2d Cir. 1980)

whether they have kidnap insurance.” 113 In 1993, the Colombian Congress passed the
Colombian Anti‐Abduction Act, which specifically prohibited kidnap insurance in an attempt
to curtail kidnappings.114 The statute—subsequently declared unconstitutional in part115—also
strengthened penalties against kidnapping and made it illegal for victims to pay ransom of
any kind.
The bottom line is that while it’s difficult to prove that kidnap insurance increases
kidnappings, the limited available evidence is entirely consistent with that possibility, and
some theoretical models predict it.
3.

Welfare Effects of Kidnap Insurance

Despite the likely existence of third party moral hazard—a positive supply response to kidnap
insurance—a complete welfare analysis needs to take account of three countervailing effects
of insurance: risk spreading, harm reducing effects, and limiting payments by victims. In the
following paragraphs, we elaborate on each of this effects.
First, kidnap insurance allows risk‐spreading. In Fink and Pingle’s model, for example,
insurance will be welfare‐enhancing, even if it generates additional kidnappings, as long as
the supply response is sufficiently small. If so, victims and their families benefit from the
increased risk‐spreading that kidnap insurance provides. If these gains are large enough,
insurance will still be good for society despite the additional costs it imposes via third party
moral hazard. In this sense, third party moral hazard is similar to its conventional first party
cousin. Even when insurance increases losses via ordinary (first party) moral hazard, it does
not follow that the world is better off without it. Insurance still contributes positively to
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PAX CRISTI NETHERLANDS, THE KIDNAP INDUSTRY IN COLOMBIA: OUR BUSINESS? 30 (Pax Christi
Netherlands ed. 2001). This evidence is consistent with insurance having a positive effect on the
aggregate amount of kidnapping. But it is also possible that insurance has no overall effect and
simply redistributes a fixed number of kidnaps to targets who have insurance and away from those
who do not.
Under the Act, any person who, “knowing that money is going to be destined to pay a ransom for
the release of an abducted individual, participates in the transaction thereof,” is considered to have
aided and abetted the kidnapper, and faces up to five years in prison. See Act 40, article 7, paragraph
2. Article 12 of the Act provides that “[w]hoever participates in an insurance contract the purpose
of which is to guarantee payment of a ransom in possible abduction cases, or who participates in the
negotiation or intermediation of the ransom demanded thereof,” faces up to two years in prison. Hargrove,
supra note 111 at 600. Kidnap insurance contracts were also declared void under the statute, and
ransom payments by a corporation could trigger suspension of governmental contracts.
Id. at 600.

welfare as long as the losses it causes are smaller than the gains it generates by shifting risk
away from risk‐averse parties to risk‐neutral ones.
Second, kidnap insurance may reduce the severity of kidnappings. By allowing victims’
families to redeem them from those kidnappers with a greater “willingness to kill” (and hence,
a greater ransom demand), insurance may reduce kidnap fatalities.116
Finally, it is possible that kidnap insurance might actually decrease victims’ willingness to pay
ransoms by helping to solve a classic overpayment problem that un‐coordinated payments
would usually entail. (This possibility is not contemplated in the kidnap/insurance models
discussed earlier.) According to a perceptive recent study, it appears that international kidnap
insurers have managed to organize the market so as to avoid the overpayments that would
otherwise occur, and that would lead to increases in kidnappings.117
The payment of ransoms generates an important externality over time—higher ransoms today
make kidnapping more attractive and thereby encourage future kidnaps. However,
individual victims or their families are concerned only with their own case. They do not care
about whether their payment raises the likelihood of subsequent kidnappings, and thus have
a tendency to “overpay” relative to the socially optimal ransom.118 If the insurance industry is
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Fink and Pingle, supra note 25. On the other hand, it is possible that there is a “marginal deterrence”
effect of anti‐kidnap laws. See Claudio Detotto, Bryan C. McCannon & Marco Vannini, Evidence Of
Marginal Deterrence: Kidnapping and Murder in Italy, 41 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 63 (2015) (finding that
murders of Italian kidnap victims went up when the punishment for kidnappings was increased,
reducing the additional punishment for “kidnap + murder” over kidnap alone.)
See Anja Shortland, supra note 5 (suggesting that an effective cartel governs international
commercial kidnap insurance, and has evolved to limit overpayment that would occur if victims
negotiated individually with kidnappers). For a recent book‐length treatment of these issues, see
ANJA SHORTLAND, KIDNAP: INSIDE THE RANSOM BUSINESS (2019).
This logic is well known. See, e.g., Rivka Weil, Exodus: Structuring Redemption of Captives, 36 CARDOZO
L. REV. 177 (2014) (pointing to the difference between one‐off and repeat players in kidnap
situations); Yvonne M. Dutton, Funding Terrorism: The Problem of Ransom Payments 53 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 335 (2016) (arguing that countries that refuse to pay ransoms when their citizens are kidnapped
by terrorists should attempt to persuade other countries to adopt similar policies); Yvonne M.
Dutton & Jon Bellish, Refusing to Negotiate: Analyzing the Legality and Practicality of a Piracy Ransom
Ban, 47 CORNELL INT’L. L. J. 299 (2014) (arguing that a ransom ban is inconsistent with criminal law’s
retributive goals, since it punishes innocent ransom‐payers who act under duress, and is likely to
be ineffective). But see, Samantha Kenney, Regional Shortcomings and Global Solutions: Kidnap, Ransom
and Insurance in Latin America, 14 CONN. INS. L. J. 557 (2008) (arguing that a private market for kidnap
insurance should be permitted, but that an international convention against kidnapping for ransom
should be promulgated by the United Nations).

properly organized, the presence of insurance may offer a way to overcome this externality,
reduce ransom payouts, and thereby actually lower the volume of kidnaps.
The evidence that victims of kidnapping will want to “overpay” ransom demands is quite
compelling. For example, the 1991 Italian law discussed earlier was at least arguably quite
effective in reducing kidnappings. Nevertheless, some victims were still kidnapped under the
new regime, and their families were apparently outraged that the authorities impeded their
efforts to pay generous ransoms to secure the return of their family members.119 The same
scenario unfolded in the kidnapping of Thomas Hargrove by FARC guerillas in Colombia in
1994: his employer refused to pay ransom, in part because it feared a wave of future
kidnappings, but his family wished to do so and negotiated with the kidnappers on their
own.120
Before kidnap victims are known, everyone should favor banning or limiting the payment of
ransoms, since it reduces kidnaps. 121 But once a kidnap has occurred, families of current
victims want to be able to pay (large) ransoms, regardless of the negative consequences for
future victims. 122 The same logic is at work in the case of Somali maritime pirates. 123

Bohlen quoted several kidnap victims or their families who were vehemently opposed to the no‐
ransom law. One father stated that “[t]he law should be abolished, immediately. . . . If there had not
been any such law, [my daughter] would have been freed at least four months earlier. When the life
of a hostage is at stake . . . putting forward purely legal arguments makes absolutely no sense.ʹʹ
Bohlen, supra note 109.
120 Hargrove’s employer “adopted a public position refusing to pay ransom. This position was
grounded, in part, on a fear of further kidnappings if ransom were paid.” Hargrove supra note 111,
at 598 (S.D. Tex. 1996). After Hargrove was released, his family then sued the employer’s insurance
company over its initial refusal to negotiate, arguing that “if the Defendants had immediately begun
negotiating with the kidnappers to pay a portion of the ransom demand, Hargrove would have been
released much sooner. The Plaintiffs [sought] $25,000,000 in actual damages, and $75,000,000 in
punitive damages.” Hargrove, supra note 111 at 599.
121 With apologies to John Rawls, one might term this ex ante perspective “operating behind the ski
mask of ignorance.”
122 As Block and Tinsley point out, “one may as well enact legislation forbidding a mugger’s victim
from responding ‘life’ to the threat of ‘your money or your life.’” W. Block & P. Tinsley, Should the
law prohibit paying ransom to kidnappers? 6 AM. REV. POL. ECON. 40 (2008). Cf. MICHAEL SCOTT MOORE,
THE DESERT AND THE SEA: 977 DAYS CAPTIVE ON THE SOMALI PIRATE COAST (2018) (suggesting that
forbidding payment of ransom is futile).
123 See Barrgh‐gaining with Somali Pirates, supra note 7 at 2 (finding empirically that “higher past ransoms
are positively associated with subsequent ransom amounts. Hence higher ransom amounts impart
a negative externality on future victims.”) Cf. Vannini et al, supra note 101
119

Conditional on being a victim of piracy, victims want to be able to pay large ransoms, since
they ignore the future incentive effects that such payments provide.
In game‐theoretic terms, kidnapping entails a classic example of “dynamic inconsistency.” Ex
ante, it is always optimal to deny that you will pay ransom in the future so as to deter
kidnappers. But if a kidnap nevertheless occurs, it is usually optimal to pay the ransom,
despite having earlier promised not to do so.
How might insurance fit into the picture? The key to internalizing the kidnap externality is to
have some party who is responsible not only for current ransom demands but for future
ransoms as well. That payor is then in a position to appreciate both the present benefits of
higher ransom payments and the future costs that it will end up having to pay.
National governments are durable institutions that might be motivated to take this long
view. 124 And a properly organized insurance industry—one with very few players who
engage in significant information sharing—might be able to achieve the same long run
perspective. As Anja Shortland perceptively points out, international kidnap insurance is in
fact organized in a way that internalizes the (future) costs of today’s overly generous payouts.
Most international kidnap insurance is written by a small and tightly‐knit group of brokers
who operate out of Lloyds of London.125 If perhaps not a formal cartel, the insurers are in close
communication with each other about their payouts. Their ability to coordinate among
themselves means that they are in a position to protect their own future interests by not over‐
paying for kidnap victims today. Because paying too much today will cause it to pay even
more in the future, a monopoly insurer (or a tightly‐knit group of insurance companies) has
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But see Gaia Pianigiani, Italy Denies Paying Ransom for Release of Aid Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2015,
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/17/world/europe/italy‐aid‐workers‐syria.html (suspecting that
the Italian government may have secretly paid ransom to terrorist kidnappers in Syria against public
policy).
Anja Shortland, supra note 5. Shortland focuses on the market for employees of first world
companies, governments and NGOs working in the third world. We know, for example, “that
foreigners . . . account for a relatively large amount of ransom payments, although they are few in
number compared with the thousands of Colombian victims every year.” The Kidnap Industry in
Colombia: Our Business? Supra note 112. Markets for insuring locals (e.g., in Colombia or Nigeria) are
run locally, and little is known about how they function. But it is unlikely that local insurance
companies are able to coordinate amongst themselves as Shortland reports is the case for
international insurers.

the motivation to hold the line on ransom payouts.126 That is an incentive that any individual
victim lacks.
D. Life Insurance
A particularly grim form of third party moral hazard comes from the relationship between
life insurance and murder. 127 While murders motivated by the existence of life insurance are
fortunately quite rare, they are by no means unheard of. 128 Indeed, some of the earliest
objections to life insurance were based on the possibility it created for beneficiaries to hasten
the death of insureds so as to collect from insurers. Geoffrey Clark’s cultural history of life
insurance demonstrates compellingly that this was a widespread—if perhaps somewhat
overblown—concern at the inception of life insurance in the early 18th century.129
Fortunately, there are many forces that run counter to the monetary gains available from
insurance‐induced murder. For most people, murder is about as taboo an activity as there is.
In addition, when A stands to realize significant pecuniary gains from B’s demise, that fact
alone will generally make A an obvious suspect should B turn up dead, which serves as a
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The largest insurer, Hiscox, has roughly 60‐70% of the market, according to its website: “We write
two thirds of the industry’s kidnap and ransom insurance premium, and have led the development
of this market for 21 years.” http://www.hiscoxlondonmarket.com/kidnap‐and‐ransom.
Thanks to Brian Galle for this suggestion.
Cf. DOUBLE INDEMNITY (Paramount Pictures, 1944) (wife hires insurance salesman to kill her
husband for the life insurance proceeds). DEATH BENEFIT (Chris/Rose Productions (1996)
(https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0118946/?ref_=ttfc_fc_tt, murder to collect life insurance). For a
compilation of real life examples, see https://www.jrcinsurancegroup.com/murder‐for‐life‐
insurance‐scams/ (listing 21 stories of insurance‐related murders in the US). See generally, CASEY
CEP, FURIOUS HOURS (2019) (narrating history of Alabama man who got away with five murders,
despite having taken out substantial life insurance policies on the victims, with himself as
beneficiary).
GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE INSURANCE IN ENGLAND, 1695‐1775 (1999),
at 26 writes that “Continental jurists . . . objected to life insurance as an inducement to fraud and
murder,” and demonstrates that such behavior was, if not common, at least not unheard of. Id at 15.
Life insurance was also widely used as a form of gambling, a mechanism that allowed the public to
make wagers on the lives of famous persons. “Much insurance in the eighteenth century was indeed
underwritten on purely speculative contingencies such as . . . the longevity of [well‐known]
individuals.” Id. at 3. Indeed, it is fear of both gambling and incentives for murder that are the
origins of the venerable “insurable interest” doctrine, a fundamental precept of insurance law
stating that insurance is unavailable unless the beneficiary has an insurable interest in (traditionally,
some kind of financial loss resulting from) the thing being insured.

deterrent to murder‐for‐insurance. 130 Finally, life insurance contracts are written with
exclusions that disallow benefits if the beneficiary caused the death of the insured,131 and in
any case, all but one state has some version of a so‐called “slayer statute” that prevents
murderers from inheriting from the estate of the person they killed.132
How significant are insurance‐motivated murders? There were about 17,000 persons
murdered in the US in 2016. 133 Unfortunately, the available statistics do not break down
murders by “motive” (nor is it even clear what such a breakdown would mean). The Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s data on “Murder by Circumstances” appears to be the closest thing
we have for the US, but it does not include any financial motives and concedes that the
circumstances were unknown or unspecified in half of the murders on file.134
A 2017 opinion piece in the Washington Post listed seven children who were killed for life
insurance proceeds during years between 1999 and 2012, although it suggested that there
were many other examples.135 Probably the best assessment of the extent of insurance‐related
murders comes from a recent report by an industry‐sponsored research group. It asserts that
it “has logged more than 160 cases of murder for life insurance in recent years.”136
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See https://www.jrcinsurancegroup.com/murder‐for‐life‐insurance‐scams/, last visited June 30,
2018. (“Money is often a primary motive for murder so one of the first questions every homicide
investigates [sic] is to find out about the life insurance policies on the deceased and to look closely
at the beneficiaries to determine if they could be a suspect.”).
See Thomas Warlick, Life Insurance – Effect of Homicide Exclusion in Double Indemnity Clause, 37 N.C.
L. REV. 92 (1958).
Carla Spivack, Killers Shouldnʹt Inherit from Their Victims‐or Should They?, 48 GA. L. REV. 145, 145
(2013) (noting that “[a]lmost all states have laws, called ‘Slayer Rules,’ barring killers from inheriting
from their victims.”).
See https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime‐in‐the‐u.s/2016/crime‐in‐the‐u.s.‐2016/tables/table‐1, last visited June
29, 2018.
134
See
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime‐in‐the‐u.s/2013/crime‐in‐the‐u.s.‐2013/offenses‐known‐to‐law‐
enforcement/expanded‐
homicide/expanded_homicide_data_table_12_murder_circumstances_2009‐2013.xls.
Australian
data do break out murder by motivation, and list money/drugs as accounting for 22/201 homicides
in 2003‐2004. See, https://aic.gov.au/publications/cfi/cfi110.
See, e.g., Editorial Board, Opinion: Too many children are killed for insurance money. Here’s how states can
stop it, WASHINGTON POST, May 14, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/too‐many‐
children‐are‐killed‐for‐insurance‐money‐heres‐how‐states‐can‐stop‐it/2017/05/14/f9b4b242‐3746‐
11e7‐b4ee‐434b6d506b37_story.html.
See http://www.insurancefraud.org/downloads/Coalition_life_disability_report_04‐17.pdf.

Thankfully, cases of murder motivated by the desire to claim insurance payouts do not appear
to cast a significant shadow on the market for life insurance. The situation was apparently
worse in the past, however,137 and it is probably because of improved law enforcement and
tighter contractual and statutory regulation that insurance‐motivated murders are now
relatively rare. These increased expenditures on law enforcement efforts should be counted
as an indirect cost of third party moral hazard. There is a more important lesson here for our
analysis, however, and it concerns the centrality of criminal law as a means of combating third
party moral hazard. We return to the role of criminal law in Part III.
II.

THE MECHANISMS OF THIRD PARTY MORAL HAZARD

In this Part, we investigate the possible causes of third party moral hazard. Since we are
dealing with a phenomenon that has received little systematic scholarly attention, we
offer several possible mechanisms by which the presence of insurance causes third
parties who are not privy to the insurance contract to engage in risk causing or harm
causing activities. We consider four explanations: deep pockets, poorer detection,
depersonalization and crowding out.
A. Deep Pockets
The most straightforward explanation of third party moral hazard is that insurers are
much wealthier than policyholders, making them more attractive targets for ripping‐off,
simply because they can cover larger losses. When asked why he robbed banks, Willie
Sutton allegedly replied “because that’s where the money is;” so too with insurers. In
many contexts, an uninsured entity’s ability to pay is significantly constrained by its
wealth. But that is essentially never true for an insurer.
For example, the staged motorcycle accident with which we began this article would
probably not be profitable if the “injurer” were uninsured and had to pay out of her own
pocket, because the “victim”/loss‐causer’s expected recovery would likely be too small.
Similarly, in the context of legal malpractice litigation, Leslie Levin has noted that
[m]any solo and very small firm lawyers do not carry LPL [lawyer’s professional
liability] insurance. If there is no insurance . . . experienced plaintiffs’ LPL lawyers
will almost never take on the malpractice case. Plaintiffs’ lawyers know that even
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if a case is meritorious, they will not receive their contingent fee because there
will be no money to pay the judgment.138

The same logic would seem to apply to those creating losses or feigning harm: there is no
profit in causing (or faking) a loss for which the “injurer” cannot pay. Thus, by
guaranteeing that there will be someone who is able to pay, the presence of insurance
promotes claiming.139
John Nyman’s “access motive” for health insurance coverage supports a different version
of this deep pockets effect, with vastly different welfare implications. Consider a kidney
transplant that costs $300,000 and will be required by 1 in 1,000 people (0.1% of the
population). Each person would be willing to pay $300 for coverage of a 0.1% risk of
needing the operation, but no one has the $300,000 to spend on her or his own. Without
insurance, therefore, there would be no transplants; with insurance, the cost of the
procedure is no longer a constraint on any individual’s ability to afford it.140 As with some
versions of liability insurance, this can be a benign story about how insurance makes it
possible to achieve outcomes that would be unobtainable in its absence. But it could also
have a darker side. Instead of legitimate claims for a justified kidney transplant, consider
medically illegitimate claims for a procedure such as an unnecessary MRI. The same logic
applies—insurance makes it possible to generate (illegitimate) claims that would not be
profitable in its absence.
B. Depersonalization
Insurance companies are not flesh and blood individuals. They are psychologically
“remote” corporate entities that are understood to be in the business of paying‐out to
cover losses. That could lead third party loss‐causers to feel less inhibited when dealing
with an impersonal corporate insurer than with an individual who has to come up with
the funds from her own bank account.141 Money paid out by an insurer probably has a
138
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Leslie Levin, When Lawyers Screw Up, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 109, 113 (2019) (reviewing HERBERT
M. KRITZER & NEIL VIDMAR, WHEN LAWYERS SCREW UP: IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR LEGAL
MALPRACTICE VICTIMS (2018)).
As we explained, liability insurance may increase both meritorious and non‐meritorious litigation.
We define third party moral hazard to include only the latter effect.
John A. Nyman, Is Moral Hazard Inefficient? The Policy Implications of a New Theory, 23 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 194 (2004).
See, e.g., Sharon Tennyson, Economic institutions and individual ethics: A study of consumer attitudes
toward insurance fraud, 32 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 247, 260 (1997) (concluding based on survey of
consumer attitudes that “tolerant attitudes toward fraud will be expressed more often by
individuals who have negative perceptions of insurance institutions“).

different moral and psychological valence for loss‐causers than money taken from the
pocket of a particular individual.142
Tom Baker’s account of the moral economy of “blood money” in tort litigation suggests
that these kinds of concerns are widespread. 143 Baker reports that plaintiffs’ lawyers
rarely ask for more in damages than the limits of the defendant’s insurance policy: funds
obtained from an insured’s personal wealth (beyond what is covered by insurance) are
known as “blood money,” and there is a widespread norm among plaintiff’s lawyers
against going after such assets (unless the tortfeasor has deliberately chosen to under‐
insure). These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that loss‐causers might feel
differently about taking money from insurers than from identifiable individuals.
C.

Poorer Detection or Worse Bargaining

Beyond enhancing ability to pay, another reason why the presence of insurance may make
for more loss‐causing by third parties is that it can enhance willingness to pay: insurers
may be in a worse position to detect false or fraudulent claims than are the individuals to
whom such claims would otherwise be made. Or, insurers might be more generous,
paying out more per dollar claimed, than individuals who are paying out of their own
pockets.
We don’t have much evidence on these issues, but consider the example of no‐fault auto
insurance fraud in New York. According to one source, fraudulent claimants were able
to swamp insurers’ claims‐handling and investigation resources by submitting phony or
exaggerated claims for reimbursement at a rate that was too high for insurers to handle
within statutorily required time limits for payment of claims.144 Insurers thus ended up
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A more traditional economic explanation concerns the diminishing marginal utility of wealth, which
drives demand for insurance. Given that dollars are especially valuable in low‐wealth states of the
world, uninsured individual tortfeasors should be willing to spend heavily to contest liability since
they are paying in high‐wealth no‐liability dollars to avoid having to pay in low‐wealth (post‐
liability) dollars. This makes them unattractive targets for third party loss‐causers, especially
compared to insurers, who “only” have routine profit motives at stake in deciding whether to
contest a claim.
Baker, Blood Money, supra note 3.
See, e.g., Hearing on No Fault Auto Insurance Fraud re: To Examine Ways To Reduce The Incidents [sic] of
No‐fault Auto Insurance Fraud In New York Before New York State Senate Standing Committee on
Insurance (2011) (statement of Jeffrey Ferguson, Bureau Chief, Rackets Division, King’s County (NY)
District Attorney’s Office) 64‐70 (suggesting that fraudulent claimants delay submission of claims
so that insurers are unable to investigate carefully without exceeding a statutory maximum time for

paying‐out on claims that an individual tortfeasor would almost certainly not have
conceded.
More generally, bad faith liability for an insurer’s failure to pay a claim could lead to
similar effects.145 If insurers are subject to treble damages for wrongly failing to pay a
claim, they will at the margin be induced to pay some questionable claims that an
individual paying out of his or her own funds would have been willing to contest.146 In
turn, insurers’ reluctance to challenge some claims makes loss‐creation more profitable
for third parties.
Of course, the reverse possibility also needs to be considered: insurers might well be better
at detecting illegal claims than individuals would be. A high‐volume claims‐processing
operation could be in position to observe suspicious patterns in claiming that would be
invisible to an individual who only sees a single request for payment. And it is likely that
there are economies of scale in fraud‐detection that insurers are better‐placed to take
advantage of than are individual payors. As for skill in negotiating, Shortland reports
that kidnap insurers drive considerably tougher bargains than individuals. These
insurers form a kind of loose cartel; and they are repeat players, not one‐shotters, so they
internalize the costs that higher ransom payouts (in today’s kidnapping) cause in the
form of more future kidnaps due to deep pockets/supply side response.
In sum, while we cannot be certain that insurers are easier “marks” than are uninsured
individuals, that may be the case in some instances, in a way that contributes to third
party moral hazard.
D.

Crowding Out

Third party moral hazard can also occur as a kind of contagion that flows from ordinary
first party moral hazard. The idea is that when party X obtains insurance, party Y—
whose function is to monitor or protect X—now has less of a reason to do so. In
equilibrium, that may either alter X’s behavior or the behavior of a “fourth” party, Z. We
call this “communicable Moral Hazard” because moral hazard in effect spreads from
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2011/examine‐ways‐reduce‐incidence no‐fault‐auto‐insurance‐fraud.
See, e.g., Mark J. Browne, Ellen S. Pryor, & Bob Puelz, The Effect of Bad‐Faith Laws on First‐Party
Insurance Claims Decisions, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 355 (2004) (finding positive correlation between the
existence of a bad‐faith remedy and higher settlement payments by insurers).
Sharon Tennyson & William J. Warfel, The Emergence and Potential Consequences of First‐Party
Insurance Bad‐Faith Liability, 28 J. INS. REG. 3 (2008).

insureds to those who interact with them. Insurance may crowd‐out monitoring by third
parties, since the costs of such monitoring are irrelevant if one’s counterparty is
insured.147
Consider the stylized example of a museum that hires a security company to guard its
collection of paintings. If they know that the museum is insured against theft, the guards
might be less vigilant than they would otherwise be. Consequently, thieves might be
more willing to rob insured premises, believing the guards will be less alert when the
property is insured.148
Or take the specialized and apparently quite generous form of insurance coverage
known as jeweler’s block policies, which cover the theft of precious stones from
jewelers.149 If thieves know that most jewelers have such coverage, they may be more
likely to rob, since they expect first party moral hazard on the part of jewelers will make
theft easier.
Sometimes, however, the contagion may move directly from the insurer to third parties,
even without any first party moral hazard. Third party moral hazard of this kind might
have played a key role in the financial crisis of 2008.150 Financial economist Darrell Duffie
rejects
[c]onventional moral‐hazard explanations of the excessive pre‐crisis leverage of
the big banks. . . . Instead, the moral hazard explanation applies to creditors [of
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Victor Goldberg’s theory of why corporations buy insurance fits well with this story. See, Victor P.
Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 5 REV. OF L. & ECON. 541
(2009) (arguing that corporations purchase insurance because their contractual counterparties—
buyers, lessors, etc.—require it).
We are grateful to Brendan Maher for this example. Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci informed us that many
art museums do not insure their paintings against theft, apparently because the most likely
purchaser of stolen art is the museum itself. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Boston Museum Says it was
Uninsured
for
Theft,
N.
Y.
TIMES,
March
20,
1990
at
A1
https://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/20/arts/boston‐museum‐says‐it‐was‐uninsured‐for‐theft.html
(suggesting that the Isabella Stewart Gardener Museum’s decision not to carry theft insurance was
“not uncommon” among museums). As with kidnap insurance, this suggests that insurance makes
ransoms more expensive, because if thieves know there is insurance, they will demand a higher
amount to redeem the stolen paintings.
For a brief discussion of these policies and their potential for conventional moral hazard, see A.M.I.
Diamonds Company v. Hanover Insurance Company, 397 F.3d 528, 530 (7th Cir. 2005) (POSNER, J)
(suggesting that moral hazard may have been at work in the robbery at issue, given the laxity of the
plaintiff’s precautions against theft).
Thanks to Gary Klein for this insight.

the Too Big to Fail banks], who were apparently convinced that these firms
would not be allowed to fail. In expanding their balance sheets with debt, [the
“insured”] financial firms did not even need to think about the moral hazard of
[their own] government bailouts—they merely needed to observe the
exceptionally low costs of debt financing offered to them by creditors.151

Rather than increasing risk‐taking by insureds, this is a story in which insurance erodes
market discipline: When a bank is understood to be “Too Big to Fail,” its lenders reason
that there’s no need to monitor it or charge a penalty for its risky behavior. If something
were to go wrong, the borrowing bank is covered; the lender would be guaranteed
repayment from the US government, acting as the bank’s implicit insurer.
Accordingly, there are really two separate mechanisms here. In one, insurance erodes
market discipline. Creditors of insured entities (here, banks) realize that they have no
need to monitor the financial health of their transacting partners, as they would usually
do. Monitoring is expensive, and any bank that gets into trouble will always be bailed
out. This is true even if there is no conventional moral hazard at all. Even if implicit
governmental guarantees do not directly cause “Too Big to Fail” banks to make riskier
loans, they can cause suppliers of credit to those banks to relax their supervision. A
second possible mechanism is that third party moral hazard can amplify conventional
moral hazard when loss creation is strategic or subject to human control. Jewel thieves
know that jewelers are insured (and may be less careful than they would otherwise be),
making them more attractive targets for robbery.
Given the current state of research it is impossible to determine which of the four
motivations we discussed is dominant. Any conclusion about the relative significance of
each would be a mere conjecture. Such uncertainty should not forestall attempts to
diminish the problem. All the explanations assume that actors who engage in risk‐or‐
harm causing behavior act in a calculating manner as they respond to the availability of
insurance. Hence, the policy responses we discuss in Part III are aimed at either raising
the likelihood of detection of loss‐causing activities or increasing penalties on such
activities, as discussed below.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this Part, we detail the costs of third party moral hazard and the efficacy and efficiency
of private sector attempts to limit it. Our bottom line is simple: controlling the loss‐
151

Darrell Duffie, supra note 20, 99 (emphasis added, citations omitted). Note that unlike formal
insurance, the risk‐spreading provided in the “Too Big to Fail” case was implicit, not contractual.

causing behavior of third parties is difficult for insurers, and even when it is possible, it
may have counterproductive effects on welfare. We conclude that extra‐contractual
measures are needed to efficiently limit third party moral hazard, and we suggest
several possibilities in this regard.
A. The Costs of Third Party Moral Hazard
In assessing the cost of third party moral hazard, it is important to distinguish between
three kinds of costs that such behavior may impose. First, there are “primary” losses.
Most economists would argue that payments made to kidnappers or fake accident
victims do not themselves constitute social losses. Such payments merely transfer money
between parties, without actually using up any resources in the process. 152 But
kidnappings and other sources of third party moral hazard do generate real losses,
including stress and hassle for kidnap victims and their families, the costs of negotiating
ransoms, and so on. And even fake accidents can entail some actual harms: for example,
if the “victim” in the auto accident had actually sustained an injury in staging the
accident, this would constitute a social loss attributable to insurance.153
In addition, third party moral hazard generates “secondary” losses in the form of the
resources used in creating fake losses (for example, the time and effort to stage them).
These expenditures constitute true losses from society’s perspective. So too do additional
expenses by insurers to audit for fraud or otherwise prevent, detect, or deter third parties
from their rent‐seeking behavior.
Finally, third party moral hazard may also generate another kind of loss, one which could
be larger than those discussed previously. These losses can occur through the creation or
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In some cases, “victims” may suffer real harms, even if their injuries were not real. Consider, for
example, a well‐known case involving the deliberate and large scale mis‐diagnosis of silicosis by a
ring of doctors and lawyers. In Re Silica Products Liability Litigation, 398 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex.
2005). Most of those diagnosed with the disease were not in fact suffering from it: they were
“screened” by fake diagnostic firms that colluded with the plaintiffs’ lawyers. Some of the victims
subsequently sued their lawyers, alleging that they “suffered injuries, both financially and mentally,
in that they lived their lives [wrongly] believing they had been diagnosed with the incurable disease
of silicosis” while their lawyers “reaped the profits of any false diagnosis.” Sabrina Canfield, Giant
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2013,https://www.courthousenews.com/giant‐malpractice‐suit‐in‐silicosis‐litigation/, quoting from
complaint by 153 plaintiffs against their lawyers, John O’Quinn and Associates.

worsening of adverse selection problems. Notice to begin that even if payments by
insurers to “victims” are not true social costs, they are certainly real from the perspective
of the insurer paying the claim. As such, they represent financial costs that the insurer
has to cover, and in a competitive equilibrium, they will be recovered in the form of
higher prices for insurance. Higher prices, in turn, make insurance less attractive to the
least risky (marginal) customers. That’s because the marginal customer (the one just
willing to buy insurance at the going rate) is typically less risky than the average
customer among all those buying. Pushing people out of the market will lower welfare:
those who value insurance by more than it would have cost to provide it to them will
suffer a loss.154
B. Self‐Help by Insurers
Insurers have developed a well‐known arsenal of weapons to combat first party moral
hazard comprising at least the following seven techniques:155 (a) deductibles and copays
(b) exclusions; (c) underwriting to screen high risk individuals; 156 (d) experience rating;
(e) loss controls; (f) ex post auditing of claims; and (g) ex ante monitoring.
There is a broad consensus among scholars of insurance law and economics that, in
combination, these measures are reasonably effective at controlling first party moral
hazard in most contexts.157 But these mechanisms are inoperative or ineffective when
applied to third party moral hazard, and efforts to control deliberate loss‐causing
behavior have different welfare consequences from attempts to control ordinary moral
hazard.
The first four techniques (deductibles, exclusions, underwriting and experience rating)
govern risk via the contract between the insurer and the policyholder; they are of little
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use in constraining the loss‐causing behavior of third parties. True, an insured with a
substantial deductible will have some reason to prevent loss‐causing by third parties,
since she or he bears some share of any loss that occurs. But this effect is likely fairly
small, and in some cases, may even worsen the problem of third party moral hazard.158
Experience rating also offers an insured a modest reason to limit losses caused by third
parties, since even if she is covered for a current loss, her future premiums will increase
as a consequence of any claim she makes.159 Underwriting is presumptively irrelevant to
third party moral hazard, since the insured’s character or riskiness is not really at issue
in the occurrence of the loss. Similarly, exclusions are of limited value in deterring third
party behavior, since the conduct that is excluded is that of the insured, while the loss is
caused by someone else.
That leaves the last three techniques—loss control, ex post auditing, and monitoring—as
the primary methods available to insurers to limit third party moral hazard. These may
be effective in some contexts, but they pose significant problems for public policy.
1. Loss Control
In some settings, insurers can and do provide instruction to policyholders on how to
avoid or mitigate risks posed by third parties. Loss control services are frequently
bundled with the provision of kidnap insurance, for example. 160 In that context, loss
control consists of advice on security—how big a wall to build around one’s house, which
areas of the city to avoid, and so on.
Third‐party generated losses are more difficult to control than those caused by first
parties, however. Third parties are active loss‐causers, who have agency and strategic
capability. Steam boilers do not take countermeasures to increase their ability to explode
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See Kai Sülzle & Achim Wambach, Insurance In A Market For Credence Goods, 72 J. RISK & INS. 159
(2005) for a theoretical model supporting such results in the context of medical care. The logic is
complicated, but turns on the fact that “physicians have to take two considerations into account
when deciding whether to diagnose honestly or not. First, the reaction of patients. If patients are
less willing to accept a high diagnosis, this makes fraudulent behavior less attractive.” But the
behavior of other physicians also matters. “If other physicians behave more dishonestly, and
patients often reject their first diagnosis, the chance is high that a patient coming to a physician is
already on his second visit. In this case, the patient would accept a high diagnosis as a confirmation
of the first diagnosis. This in turn makes fraudulent behavior more attractive.” Id. at 160.
Presumably, these forces where what motivated the driver in the fake car accident video, supra note
4, to install a dashboard camera in her car.
Shortland supra note 5.

if they are inspected more frequently. Kidnappers and pirates, however, do respond to
efforts to limit their effectiveness.161 Moreover, some third party activities are simply not
amenable to loss control directed at first parties. Drug copays, excessive MRI use, and
insurance‐related murders cannot easily be mitigated by training policyholders about
how to avoid such losses.162 Third party loss controls also work poorly or not at all in
some types of liability insurance, especially where insureds and injurers are strangers, as
in the Friends of the Friendless auto fraud gang or the no‐fault auto example discussed
earlier.
Some kinds of liability insurance—for example, Directors and Officers policies—might
seem to be amenable to loss control activities directed against third parties. Insurers
could provide companies with advice on implementing best practices for corporate
governance so as to reduce the risk of being sued for a violation of corporate law, for
example. But in practice, D&O insurers do not seem to make widespread use of loss
control, for reasons that are not well understood.163
By contrast, Employment Practices Liability (EPL) insurers widely tout their loss‐control
services as part of their marketing efforts. 164 But even when loss control can be used
effectively, limiting third party‐caused losses has different welfare implications than
preventing first party losses. There are at least two important differences between first‐
and third‐party loss control to consider in the liability insurance context.
a. Harm Reduction vs Liability Reduction
The first is the distinction between loss prevention and harm prevention. In first party
moral hazard, preventing losses is straightforward: the insurer tells the policyholder how
to inspect his boiler to minimize the chance it will explode, or how to store chemicals to
prevent a leak. But there are actually two kinds of “prevention” at work in the context of
liability insurance: forestalling legal liability (conditional on harm) and preventing the
occurrence of the harm itself. For example, many EPL insurers advertise their ability to
help employers “bullet‐proof” their employment policies by establishing proper training
161
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De Groot et al. supra note 7.
Indeed, even when consumers are coached to use cheaper MRIs, they don’t do so. See Jeff Lagasse,
Why do Patients Often Opt for Pricier MRI Tests? They Don’t Shop Around, HEALTHCARE FINANCE NEWS,
Aug. 1, 2018 https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/why‐do‐patients‐often‐opt‐pricier‐
mri‐tests‐they‐dont‐shop‐around.
Baker & Griffith supra note 42. But see discussion TAN 180 of use of the duty to defend/right to
control to deter litigation in this context.
Talesh supra note 156, at 239.

procedures, refining language in employee handbooks, and so on. 165 Following best
practices for Human Resources management may indeed reduce the likelihood that a
plaintiff is successful in a lawsuit against the insured. But preventing liability ex post is
not the same as preventing the actual occurrence of losses ex ante, and most employer
training probably has little or no effect on actual behavior—that is, on losses resulting
from employee misconduct, such as harassment.166 Rather, loss control in the context of
EPL insurance has become a kind of “bureaucratic vaccine against lawsuits for
harassment.”167
Loss controls that actually reduce the incidence of harms ex ante are different from those
that simply forestall liability ex post. Cost‐effective harm reduction benefits both the
insured and potential victims (who are not injured), with clear positive welfare effects.
Forestalling liability (without reducing harm) will presumably deter some third parties
from loss‐causing behavior: fake victims are less likely to file lawsuits if such suits are
less likely to succeed. But if insureds can defeat liability without actually reducing harms,
then even victims with legitimate claims are less likely to succeed. Reducing the success
rate of plaintiffs (without reducing the incidence of harms) deters deliberate loss‐causers,
but at a cost of leaving all losses where they fall, even for innocent victims who did
nothing to cause their loss.
b. Diversion
A second problem with efforts to control losses from third parties is that they may lead
to the strategic diversion of harm‐causing activity. For example, suppose a kidnap
insurer advises a policyholder to build a larger wall around his house to deter
kidnappers. If the wall does its job, it will reduce the likelihood of third party moral
hazard directed at the policyholder (and his insurer). But it will likely do so, in large
measure, by deflecting potential kidnappers towards some other victim, with little or no
gain to society as a whole. Indeed, shifting the incidence of misdeeds from one party to
another will typically produce net social losses—building the wall uses up resources
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without reducing kidnapping at all, and may even create negative externalities in the
form of too many walls.168
A further wrinkle is that precautions that are unobservable to potential wrong‐doers may
yield social gains. For example, if kidnappers can’t tell who has an alarm system and who
doesn’t, then when A installs a new alarm, she raises the average level of precautions
among all victims, and hence lowers the expected return to kidnapping generally.169
Our bottom line is that loss controls can sometimes reduce some kinds of moral hazard
caused by third parties. Unlike efforts to limit first‐party losses, however, loss control
activities directed against third parties are unlikely to be socially optimal: insurers will
choose the wrong scope and type of loss controls because they do not take sufficient
account of the externalities that third‐party loss controls engender.
2. Monitoring
Another approach to limiting ordinary moral hazard is through monitoring of the
insured’s conduct. The conventional wisdom is that if an insured’s actions can be
perfectly observed, it becomes possible to write a contract that specifies the degree of
riskiness the insured is able to undertake, eliminating the problem of moral hazard
altogether.170 Of course, third parties can be difficult to monitor, since they operate in the
wild and their identities are not known to the insurer in advance of any loss they cause.
But first‐party monitoring can be used to deter some kinds of third‐party moral hazard,
since loss‐causers must usually interact with insureds in some fashion in order to create
a compensable injury. For example, the use of automobile dashboard cameras, might
have a dramatic impact on the possibilities for third party moral hazard in automobile
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insurance. It is therefore surprising that the technology has not been widely adopted in
the US (although it is increasingly used in other countries).171
American auto insurers apparently do not promote dash cams, 172 as their British
counterparts assuredly do. 173 One explanation is that the volume of fraudulent third‐
party‐caused losses in US auto liability insurance may not be high enough to justify
subsidizing this kind of monitoring.174 But it seems unlikely that fraudulent losses are a
bigger problem in the UK than in the US. Perhaps there are cultural differences that
explain US drivers’ lag in adopting dash cams, but the evidence does seem to suggest
that cameras are gaining in popularity, albeit from a small base. As of 2018, “there [were]
three times as many online searches for terms like ʺdash camʺ as . . . for autonomous
driving, according to new data from Google. U.S. wholesale shipments of dash cams are
expected to hit 285,000 this year, up 20% from 2017. . . “175
3. Pre‐Committing to (first party) Moral Hazard?
Most liability insurance policies give the insurer the duty of covering both the underlying
loss (the duty to indemnify) and any legal defense mounted by the insured (the duty to

British insurer Aviva recently reported, based on a nationally representative sample of 2,438 UK
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defend).176 The logic for doing so is clear: if policyholders paid for their own defense, but
insurers covered any damages for which the policyholder was ultimately found liable,
the insured would want to spend almost nothing on defending the claim, since all
damages would be paid by the insurer.
Usually, therefore, the duty to defend is bundled with the right to control the defense:
the party that has to pay (here, the insurer) gets to choose how to organize the defense
and how much to spend. Again, this makes sense. Consider a policy that covered defense
costs only, not liability, and left control of spending with the insured. Such a policy
would allow the policyholder to choose what kind of defense to mount and how much
(of the insurer’s money) to spend, while leaving her with any liability that resulted. In
this setting, the policyholder would obviously want to mount a very expensive defense:
why spare any costs when they are being borne by someone else? This is the familiar
story of (first party) moral hazard.
In D & O liability insurance, however, the duty to defend and the right to control the
defense are often separated.177 Technically, this is known as a duty to reimburse, rather
than a duty to defend, and given the logic above, its existence seems puzzling. Why
would insurers cede control over the defense and agree to let policyholders freely spend
the insurance company’s money to defend against liability?
One explanation is that insurers with reimbursement duties do retain some control over
defense costs through co‐control language, which allows them to forestall some moral
hazard problems. 178 But here, first party moral hazard may be a feature, not a bug,
because it can be used to control third party moral hazard.
Suppose insureds face the possibility of many strike suits that are brought purely for
their settlement value. (That is, the suits would lose if they were litigated, but the costs
of mounting a defense are high relative to the costs of filing a complaint.) By pre‐paying
for an insurance policy that covers generous spending to defend against litigation,

176

177

178

For an excellent analytic and institutional overview, see Charles Silver, The Basic Economics of the
Duty to Defend, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN THE LAW & ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE 438 (Daniel
Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman, eds., 2015). We owe the key insight in this section to a conversation
with Steve Thel.
Silver, Id.; Nick Nierengarten, The Duty to Advance or Reimburse Defense Costs v. the Duty to Defend,
AMERICAN
BAR
ASSOCIATION,
December
12,
2012,
available
at
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/insurance/articles/novdec2012‐reimburse‐
defense‐costs.html#_ednref5.
Id.

insureds are able to make a credible commitment that they will not settle if sued.179 In
turn, that should mean that plaintiffs will be deterred from filing strike suits in the first
instance, knowing that policyholders will want to freely spend their insurer’s money to
hire the best lawyers and use them extensively in defending against any claims. In
equilibrium, therefore, defense reimbursement will not actually be necessary, and
premiums can be quite low as a result.
C. Governmental Assistance
Insurers are constrained by the scope of contract law in their ability cope with third party
moral hazard. These constraints, we believe, create an important role for governmental
actors, whose powers are much broader. Private markets in risk require a regulatory
infrastructure to function effectively. We note at the outset that we fully agree with Dan
Davies’ view that it will not be cost effective to eliminate fraud completely. 180
Nonetheless, governmental action is required to reduce third party moral hazard to the
optimal level.
1. Law Enforcement
Not all third party moral hazard—at least as we have defined it—is illegal.181 But law
enforcement actions by the state provide an important tool in the portfolio of methods
for combating the phenomenon. Kidnapping and murder, for example, are obviously
criminal offenses. And insurance‐motivated kidnapping or murder are best treated as
crimes, rather than as an attempt to extract money from insurers.
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DAN DAVIES, LYING FOR MONEY: HOW LEGENDARY FRAUDS REVEAL THE WORKINGS OF OUR WORLD 16
(2018). As Davies explains, “one of the key decisions that an economy has to make is how much
effort to spend on checking [for illegal activities]. This choice will determine the amount of fraud.
And since checking costs money and trust is really productive, the optimal level of fraud is unlikely
to be zero.” Id. at 16‐17.
For example, consider drug copay schemes discussed earlier, which are apparently legal in most
(but not all) US states.

Various forms of fraud are also criminal offenses, and schemes of the type engineered by
Michael Cohen182 are also handled by licensure and criminal law regimes.183 Enhanced
criminal enforcement is likely to be the best way of deterring large‐scale third party moral
hazard.184 More generally, the state has a potential role to play by barring certain kinds
of third party moral hazard, as Massachusetts and a few other states have chosen to do
in the case of drug copay coupons.
An important risk with state intervention is that it may crowd‐out or substitute for
private enforcement efforts. On the other hand, state actors do not have the same kind of
financial relationship to third party moral hazard as insurers do. Insurers obviously
understand that the more claims they turn down, the higher their short run profits. So at
the margin, insurers have a built‐in incentive to deny claims of ambiguous validity.185
Shifting some of the job of nabbing third party loss‐causers to the state therefore eases
pressure on insurers to deny claims, and benefits innocent claimants.
2. Technology Standardization and Reporting
An obvious role for collective action in combating third party moral hazard is to regulate
the collection and transmission of data that can be used to detect it. For example, US Life
Insurers have apparently established a system of record‐keeping for “police departments
to check if a homicide victim is named on a life insurance policy. Several perpetrators
have been arrested and convicted thanks to this system.”186 In 2018, English police and
dash‐camera manufacturers collaborated on a national dash cam safety portal, which
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“allows owners of any brand of dash cam to submit footage quickly and easily to the
relevant authorities.” 187
Monitoring technologies are a double‐edged sword, however: they expose illicit activities
but raise severe privacy concerns. Therefore, it will be necessary for governments to
regulate the permissible uses of information derived from monitoring so as to protect
privacy concerns. The social value of dash cameras as deterrents to third party moral
hazard appears from our crude calculations to be smaller than one might think. If they
expose users to significant privacy losses, they are even less attractive. Society thus faces
the challenge of designing rules for the use of dash camera data that take appropriate
account of drivers’ legitimate privacy interests.
3. Cartelization or Regulation of Industry Structure
As Anya Shortland persuasively demonstrated in the case of kidnap insurance,188 some
types of third party moral hazard can be managed through the structural design
(“governance”) of insurance market contracting. If insurance is provided by a small
group (“club”) of sellers, with close social ties and the ability and incentives to share
information, it may be possible to overcome certain kinds of dynamic coordination
problems that would occur when individual victims make separate payments out of their
own pockets.
4. Qui Tam Suits
In addition to the possibilities just discussed, we propose the recognition of a new private
cause of action termed an insurance qui tam suit. Our model is based on existing anti‐
fraud legislation at the federal level, especially the False Claims Act,189 which has been
used to recover more than $2.5 billion in healthcare fraud and false claims in 2016 alone.190
The idea is that allowing private individuals to bring suits on behalf of insurers against
entities that file false claims for insurance payments amplifies the disincentives.
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At its simplest, qui tam litigation expands ordinary notions of standing by offering a
bounty to plaintiffs who bring suits to recover losses experienced by someone else.191
Traditionally, that “someone else” is the sovereign, who might, for example, be the victim
of fraud by a party from whom it has purchased goods or services. Rather than leaving
it solely to the government to detect and prosecute fraud, qui tam actions permit those
with knowledge of harm to the government to obtain a bounty by uncovering and
prosecuting wrongdoing on their own, even though they have not experienced any loss
themselves.
Our proposal expands qui tam actions so that private individuals can sue third party
loss‐causers on behalf of insurers, with the right to a share of any funds recovered.
Consider, for example, a doctor involved in one of the phony clinics that were set up to
“treat” accident victims in the New York no‐fault auto insurance scams described
earlier.192 In return for surfacing the problem and pursuing litigation against her or his
co‐conspirators, the plaintiff (or relator, in qui tam parlance) would be entitled to a
percentage of whatever recovery was obtained for the insurance company. As we noted,
a vibrant insurance qui tam mechanism already exists in cases where government
provides (health) insurance, namely Medicare and Medicaid. While qui tam liability is
not without controversy, the evidence in health care and elsewhere suggests that it has
been effective.193 Our proposal would extend this mechanism to private insurers.
Litigation theory suggests that profit‐maximizing private actors should be willing to
bring any case with a positive expected value. 194 That would imply that insurance
companies already have a good reason to sue any third party who caused them losses (as
long as they thought they could recover more than the costs of the litigation). Moreover,
insurers can often make use of the law of subrogation, which allows them to pay the
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claims of their insured and then go after those who caused the loss to recover for the
amount paid. Given all that, it might seem as if there would be little reason to supplement
ordinary liability by bringing in an additional class of plaintiffs (relators).
However, there are at least three problems with relying on insurers to go after third party
loss‐causers on their own. First, insurers don’t necessarily want to prevent all losses, and
may not zealously pursue loss‐causers. The argument is complicated, but in its basic
outline, the idea is that insurers will prefer losses to grow as long as it increases demand
for insurance on the margin.195
More generally, there is elegant theoretical work suggesting that insurance fraud is
inherently an equilibrium phenomenon. 196 What this means is that under plausible
conditions, there will always be some fraud that insurers will optimally choose not to
uncover, leaving at least the possibility that others may be able and willing to do so. The
game‐theoretic logic of this insight is as follows. Suppose initially that 10 percent of all
claims are fraudulent. Suppose further that at some cost, insurers could audit every claim
and perfectly detect whether it is fraudulent. Even if such audits are profit‐maximizing
(that is, they cost less than the expected savings they generate) when 10 percent of claims
are fraudulent, they will certainly not be profitable if all fraud has been successfully
detected and deterred. At that point, of course, there will be no fraud left to detect, so
there will be no justification for spending anything to detect it. And if insurers stop
auditing altogether, fraudsters can go back to committing fraud, secure in the knowledge
that they won’t (all) be caught. The bottom line is that unless insurers can somehow
commit themselves to auditing even when auditing is unprofitable—and this seems difficult
if not impossible to do—there will necessarily be some fraud that goes unsanctioned. In
turn, this implies that in equilibrium, there will be some “room” for private actors to
uncover fraud (if they can do so at a lower cost than insurers) can.
Second, insurers may simply lack the information about whom to sue, because deliberate
loss‐causing is invariably covert. Even when the necessary information can be uncovered
through audits or other techniques (and that is not always the case), these can be costly
and difficult to undertake. But third party “insiders” already have exactly the
information necessary to pursue such litigation—they know how such schemes are
organized and implemented, including the tricks used to conceal them. So, they will
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operate with an informational advantage over insurers, and can find it worthwhile to
pursue litigation that insurers would not find it cost effective to bring.
Finally, the problem is not simply that insurers are uninformed or under‐zealous. Indeed,
insurers are widely believed to be over‐zealous—at least at times—for example, in
denying claims of loss by their own policyholders. 197 Thus, simply strengthening
insurers’ ability to go after third party loss‐causers directly may lead to over‐
enforcement.
Therefore, we propose allowing other actors to supplement the enforcement efforts of
insurance companies through a kind of bounty scheme. Going back to the three issues
discussed earlier, an insurance qui tam system would get around the problem that
insurers might not want to bring all of the claims they could. Our proposal would give
non‐insurance plaintiffs an incentive to crack down on third party loss‐causers,
independent of whatever insurers themselves decide to do.
Moreover, third party “defectors” will often have an important cost or informational
advantage over insurers, because they themselves are or were insiders, already well‐
acquainted with the specifics of how loss‐causing schemes operate. They may not need
to investigate, audit, or detect anything, since their jobs are precisely to execute some
aspect of whatever scheme is at issue. In other cases, relators may not have all the facts,
but do possess detailed knowledge of how fraudulent activity is carried out in general,
knowledge that outsiders lack.
By outsourcing enforcement, we also lessen the risks that insurers will have too much
power or will be able to threaten not to pay claims because of suspected fraud.
Furthermore, qui tam liability offers potential whistleblowers an incentive to “defect” by
turning against their fellow miscreants.198 In turn, that should make it more difficult for
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conspiracies to form in the first place by weakening trust among conspirators, each of
whom will have to worry that one of their partners might turn against them to collect the
qui tam bounty.
We also call for the implementation of same safeguards used in the FCA to prevent over‐
enforcement199 and agency problems:
the FCA aims to mitigate concern about private overenforcement by granting the
Attorney General—and, by further delegation, the DOJʹs Civil Fraud Section—
substantial authority to oversee and control qui tam litigation. Thus, the DOJ may
dismiss or settle a qui tam case out from under a private relator, subject only to a basic
fairness hearing. In addition, the DOJ must consent to any private dismissal or settlement
of a qui tam action.200

Just as the Federal government does, insurers should be a role in any qui tam litigation.
Otherwise, relators could just initiate a lawsuit on their own and then settle the matter at
a steep discount, precluding the insurer from litigating similar claims against the
defendant. 201 Hence, we believe that insurers should have the power to oppose
settlements that are detrimental to their interests. Only if the insurer declines to litigate
the case would relators have the ability to proceed independently.
Finally, similarly to the FCA, we would also allow the insurer to intervene and “take
control over the litigation, including limiting a relatorʹs procedural rights,” 202 in
appropriate cases in which third party moral hazard is especially damaging. A relator’s
award, under our proposal, would be comparable to those offered under FCA: 25 to 30
percent if the relator litigates alone and 10 to 15 percent if the insurer takes over. We
believe that the use of qui tam litigation can significantly diminish instances of third
party moral hazard.

CONCLUSION
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Contrary to the conventional wisdom, this Article has established that insurance alters
the behavior of third parties who interact with insureds in socially detrimental ways.
Specifically, the desire of third parties to claim insurance payments often causes them to
act illicitly or immorally. We termed this effect “third party moral hazard” and
demonstrated that it arises in a myriad of insurance contexts. In certain instances, such
as kidnap insurance, the presence of insurance can induce extreme antisocial behavior in
the form of kidnaps. In others, such as automobile insurance, it can motivate third parties
to feign injuries and file spurious claims against insureds. In other instances, such as
health insurance, it may elicit “offensive medicine” that includes referral of patients to
unnecessary tests and treatments. Insurance therefore gives rise to a paradox: it brings
about the very risks and harms that insureds want to avoid.
Unlike standard first party moral hazard that can largely be managed by contractual
design, third party moral hazard does not lend itself to contractual solutions. Insurers
have no privity with third party loss‐creators. Worse yet, the individuals whose actions
insurance will influence cannot even be identified in advance. Hence, third party moral
hazard presents a formidable challenge to insurance companies and policymakers alike.
Yet, as we suggest, third party moral hazard can be significantly ameliorated via a
combination of self‐help measures, monitoring mechanisms, criminal enforcement and
the use of qui tam suits.
We have also established that the aggregate social cost of third‐party moral hazard is
considerable. Although, given the current state of knowledge, it is impossible to
approximate the aggregate social cost of third party moral hazard with any degree of
precision, it is fair to assume that, in extreme cases, it may even render certain kinds of
insurance socially undesirable. We hope that the foregoing analysis will inspire others to
investigate this issue further, both theoretically and empirically. The phenomenon of
third‐party moral hazard is a fertile ground for scholarly research. Gaining better
purchase on third party moral hazard would enable us to engage in a more accurate
assessment of the virtues and vices of insurance and devise better policy responses to
insurance abuse.

